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Paradise Lost: Can the European
Union Expel Countries from the
Eurozone?
Jens Dammann

ABSTRACT

There was a time, not too long ago, when the introduction
of the euro was hailed as a tremendous success. Yet the
Eurozone now faces an existential crisis. A number of member
states have, since 2008, been prevented from defaulting on their
sovereign debt only by massive bailouts. Greece has teetered on
the verge of insolvency for years despite repeated such measures.
Many observers now believe that Greece should stay in the
European Union but leave the Eurozone, a scenario often
referred to as the "Grexit." This would allow Greece to devalue
its currency and thereby render its economy more competitive.
But just as crucially, from the perspective of Greece's sharpest
critics, a Grexit would rid the Eurozone of a member state that
may no longer be willing to abide by the Eurozone's austerityoriented economic policies, which aim at limiting budget deficits
and government debt even in times of economic distress. The
current Greek government is adamantly opposed to leaving the
Eurozone, but this has not put an end to the debate. Rather, a
growing chorus of politicians and pundits now argue that
Greece should be expelled from the Eurozone.
Of course, this demand raises a fundamental legal
question: Is it possible-and should it be-to 'terminate a
country's membership in the Eurozone without that country's
consent? This Article argues that in narrowly defined
circumstances, a right to expel countries from the Eurozone not
only is desirable as a matter of legal policy but also deserves
recognition as a matter of black letter law. However, this Article
also shows that such an expulsion has to remain an ultima
ratio. As of now, Greece does not even come close to satisfying its
conditions.
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PARADISE LOST

I. INTRODUCTION

A scenario in which the U.S. government forced one of the fifty
states or the District of Columbia to abandon the dollar would plainly
be ridiculous. Yet transposed across the Atlantic, where nineteen
member states of the European Union now form the Eurozone, such a
scenario elicits a mixed response.
The European Commission has traditionally taken the view that
no country can or should be forced out of the Eurozone. 1 Those few
authors in the legal literature who have addressed the question have
generally shared this position. 2 However, at least as a matter of legal
policy, this approach is no longer uncontested. German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, viewed by many as Europe's most powerful head of
state and de facto leader, 3 has made it plain that she believes

1.
Barroso: 'No Country Can Be Expelled from Eurozone', EURACTIV (Mar. 19,
2010) [hereinafter Barroso], http://www.euractiv.com/prioritiesbarroso-no-country-canbe -expelled -eurozone- news -358343 [https://perma.cc/Q4QA-S4UA] (archived Feb. 12,
2016).
2.
See, e.g., Thomas Giegerich, Article 60: Termination or Suspension of the
Operation of a Treaty, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1021, 1042
(Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012) [hereinafter Giegerich, Article 60];
Ulrich Hide, Artikel 140 EUV, in EUV/AEUV 62 (Christian Calliess & Matthias
Ruffert eds., 4th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Hdde, Artikel 140]; Ulrich Hide, Die
Europdische Wdhrungsunion in der Internationalen Finanzkrise-An den Grenzen
Europdischer Solidaritdt? [The European Monetary Union in the International
FinancialCrisis-At the Limits of European Solidarity?], 45 EUROPARECHT [EUR] 854,
865 (2010) [hereinafter Hdde, Europdischer Solidaritdt]; Christoph Herrmann,
Griechische Tragddie-Der Wdihrungsverfassungsrechtliche Rahmen far die Rettung,
den Austritt oder den Ausschluss von Oberschuldeten Staaten aus der Eurozone [Greek
Tragedy-The Constitutional Framework for the Rescue, the Withdrawal, or the
Expulsion from the Eurozone of States with Excessive Debts], 13 EUROPMSCHE
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZWI 413, 417 (2010); Ren6 Smits, The Crisis
Response in Europe's Economic and Monetary Union: Overview of Legal Developments,
38 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1135, 1139-40 (2015); Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and
Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections 33 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Legal
Working Paper No. 10, 2009); cf. THOMAS OPPERMANN ET AL., EUROPARECHT § 9.7 (7th
ed. 2014) (calling an expulsion from the Eurozone highly unrealistic). But see Norbert
Horn, Die Reform der Europdischen Wdhrungsunion und die Zukunft des Euro [The
Reform of the European Monetary Union and the Future of the Euro], 64 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1398, 1403 (2011) (arguing that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a right to expel member states from the
Eurozone in case of a grave violation of EU law).
3.
See, e.g., Alison Smale & Andrew Higgins, Debt Crisis May Be Defining
Moment for Greece, and for Angela Merkel, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/201 5/0625/world/europe/greek-debt-european-union-angelamerkel.html [https://perma.cc/6Q85-RM26] (archived Mar. 3, 2016). Most observers
agree that Germany has been the key power in determining the handling of the euro
crisis. See, e.g., Andrew Higgins, Setting a Deadline for Greece Proves Much Easier
than Sealing a Fate, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Higgins, Setting a
http://www.nytimes.com201 5/07/09/worldleurope/setting-a-deadline-forDeadline],
[https://perma.cc/7YL8-TAV5]
greece-proves-much-easier-than-sealing-a-fate.html
(archived Mar. 3, 2016); Neil Irwin, How Germany Prevailed in the Greek Bailout, N.Y.
TIMES (July 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/europe/how-germany-
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membership in the Eurozone ought to be contingent on good behavior:
in Merkel's view, a member state that persistently breaches the rules
4
governing the Eurozone should be subject to expulsion.
Only a few years ago, this question might have seemed largely
theoretical. However, as Greece's economy has descended into a
downward spiral of repeated bailouts, ballooning government debt,
soaring unemployment, and economic contraction, the question of an
involuntary exit from the Eurozone has attained practical urgency.
The voices calling for Greece to leave the Eurozone are legion,
and, in light of the Greek government's adamant refusal to
contemplate such a step, a growing chorus of pundits and politicians
in other member states has been willing to discuss Greece's
involuntary expulsion from the Eurozone. 5 These voices have become
so loud that, in the summer of 2015, Janis Varoufakis, then Greece's
finance minister, found it necessary to threaten legal action if an
6
expulsion were attempted.
Why does Greece face calls for expulsion when other
economically troubled member states did not? One reason presumably
lies in the sheer depth of Greece's economic crisis. Many observers
simply no longer believe that it is possible for Greece to recover from
its economic crisis while remaining in the Eurozone, or at least not at
7
a price that the other member states would be willing to pay.
Admittedly, the latest bailout, negotiated in 2015 and following on
the heels of two prior bailouts, will stave off Greek insolvency for
now. 8 However, it is not clear how that bailout will help Greece exit
prevailed-in -the-greek-bailout.html [https://perma.ceIGHY6-P5HY] (archived Mar. 3,
2016) (quoting Finnish finance minister Alexander Stubb's statement that Germany
was "in the driver's seat" during the negotiations with Greece).
4.
Patrick McGroarty & Matthew Karnitschnig, Merkel Floats Option of
Euro-Zone Expulsion, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424052748704743404575127190480343692 [https://perma.ce/ZBC3-XXB8] (archived
Feb. 12, 2016).
5.
See Ambrose Evans -Pritchard, Greece Threatens Top Court Action to Block
Grexit, TELEGRAPH (June 29, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/1170
7092/Greece-threatens -top -court-action -to-block-Grexit.html
[https://perma.ccH4FWP3CD] (archived Feb. 12, 2016) (citing both the French President Franqois Hollande
and the head of the German social-democratic party, Sigmar Gabriel, as saying that a
no vote in the Greek referendum would mean leaving the Eurozone).
6.
Id.
7.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Greece over the Brink, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinionlpaul-krugman-greece-over-the-brink.html
[https://perma.ec/8PC5-45TV] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (arguing that without a Grexit,
"Greece will face endless austerity, and a depression with no hint of an end"); cf.
Desmond Lachman, The Euro Is a Straitjacket for Greece, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.comroomfordebate/2015/06/30/should-greece-abandon-theeuro/the-euro-is-a-straitjacket-for-greece [https://perma.cc/F3MR-T3U9] (archived Feb.
12, 2016) (arguing that Greece should leave the Eurozone to avoid becoming a failed
state).
8.
See Suzanne Daley, Greece's Leader Starts Big Economic Overhaul, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/europe/alexistsipras-of- greece-faces -bailout-mandates-in-next-test.html?_r=0 [https://perma.ccMK7
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the deep depression in which it now finds itself. 9 Rather, many
experts believe that Greece needs to reacquire, and subsequently
devalue, its own currency in order for its economy to become
1
competitive again. 0
However, there exists another, perhaps more important, reason
for Greece's facing calls for expulsion from the Eurozone where other
member states did not. Unlike other member states that found
themselves in economic difficulties, Greece has dared to rebel openly
against the legal framework of the Eurozone, which heavily
emphasizes budget discipline and monetary stability. 11 The European
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and a German-led
majority of other member states want Greece to tackle its crisis
through so-called austerity policies. 12 These include slashing the
budget and raising taxes. 13 This approach reflects the legal rules
governing the Eurozone, which impose strict limits on government
debt and budget deficits. 14 By contrast, the current Greek
government rose to power after campaigning against the very

J-ZC751 (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (noting that the 2015 bailout package allowed Greece
to avoid default); Phillip Inman, Where Did the Greek Bailout Money Go?, GUARDIAN
(June 29, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/29/where-did-the-greekbailout- money-go [https://perma.cc/E4L2-ACAW] (archived Feb. 12, 2016) (noting that
Greece also received bailouts in 2010 and 2012).
See Liz Alderman, Tentative Greek Debt Accord Might Do Little To Revive
9.
Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Alderman, Tentative Greek Accord],
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12[business/international/greece-third-bailout-deal.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/P4YW-GEA8] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (noting that the bailout deal
"would grant Greece billions of euros in fresh aid to avoid an imminent default but
would not help revive the Greek economy, which has plunged into a deep recession,"
and stressing that "[t]he deal ... offers no relief on Greece's staggering debt").
See, e.g., Nouriel Roubini, Greece Must Go, SLATE (May 18, 2012, 6:20 AM),
10.
http:/www.slate.com/articles/news and politics/politics/2012/05/greece will leave the
[https://perma.cc/2PEH-VSJGI
eurozonesooner or later sooner is better_.html
(archived Feb. 12, 2016) (suggesting that Greece's only hope of escaping economic
depression is to leave the Eurozone); Hans-Werner Sinn, Why Greece Should Give Up
the Euro, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015107/25/opinion/whygreece-should-leave-the-eurozone.html [https://perma.cc/553X-FTDX] (archived Mar. 3,
2016) (arguing that a Grexit would lead to devaluation, which in turn would benefit the
Greek economy). But see Nicholas Economides et al., What's at Stake in the Greek Vote,
WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2012, 7:07 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702
303822204577466541312448940 [https://perma.cc/B95L-G6YV] (archived Mar. 3, 2016)
(equating an exit from the Eurozone with "fiscal suicide").
Cf. Richard Barley, Testing the Market's Greek Calm, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18,
11.
2015, at C12 [hereinafter Barley, Testing the Market] (pointing out that Greece is
challenging "[t]he eurozone's economic orthodoxy").
See infra Part II.
12.
13.
See, e.g., Rose Troup Buchanan, Greece Debt Crisis Explained: A History of
Just How the Country Landed Itself in Such a Mess, INDEPENDENT (July 4, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greece-debt-crisis-explainer-a-history
-of-how-the-country-landed-itself-in-such- a- mess- 10365798.html [https:/perma.cc/3LU
F-FJJ3] (archived Feb. 12, 2016) (noting that the ECB, the IMF, and the European
Commission gave Greece access to loans "in exchange for spending cuts and tax hikes").
See infra Part II.
14.
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austerity policies that Greece is now asked to adopt. 15 In a recent
referendum, Greece's citizens made it clear that they share the
16
government's skepticism towards austerity-based economic policy.
Incidentally, this position is supported by many economists,
particularly in the United States, who believe that cutting spending
17
in the middle of a downturn is highly counterproductive.
This clash of opinion between Greece and much of the rest of
Europe has yet to be resolved. For the time being, the Greek
government has promised to implement austerity-oriented reforms,
18
but it has done so only in order to secure another bailout.
Accordingly, many observers doubt the Greek Prime Minister's
commitment to such reforms. 19 It also remains unclear whether the
Greek government is even able to implement the promised reforms,
given that they face massive opposition from within the ranks of the
ruling party. 20 Having won a snap election in September 2015,21 the
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras now looks stronger than only a
few months ago, but, in light of the Herculean tasks ahead of him, his
current political support may well prove short lived.

15.
See infra Part II.
16.
See infra Part II.
17.
See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 7 (blaming Greece's economic collapse on
austerity policies); see also Irwin, supra note 3 (reporting that "many economists,
particularly in the United States and Britain," believe "the continued imposition of a
budget-cutting-first approach during an extended downturn is holding back recovery").
18.
In fact, Prime Minister Tsipras made it very clear, when voting for a
package of reforms in July 2015, that he only voted in favor to avoid financial collapse.
Renee Maltezou & Angeliki Koutantou, Greek ParliamentApproves Bailout Measures
as Syriza Fragments, REUTERS (July 16, 2015) http://www.reuters.com/article/useurozone-greece-idUSKBNOP40EO20150716 [https://perma.cc/4MZV-SZMQ] (archived
Feb 12, 2016).
19.
See, e.g., Henry Chu, Key Players Doubt Greek Rescue Plan Has a Chance,
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.latimes.comlworld/la-fg-greece-bailout-talks20150803-story.html [https://perma.cc/L6JD-894G] (archived Feb. 12, 2016) (citing
doubts by Greek economist Manos Matsaganis and others as to whether the Tsipras
government will follow through with the reforms it promised); James Kanter, Meeting
on Greece Debt Breaks up with No Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015),
http:/lwww.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/business/greece-debt-plan-at-next-crucial-stage-asfinance- ministers -meet.html [https://perma.cc/X4UW-RJ8Y] (archived Mar. 3, 2016)
(noting other countries' doubts as to whether the Tsipras government is committed to
reform).
20.
See Jack Ewing & Niki Kitsantonis, Greece Made Preparationsto Exit Euro,
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/business/greece-debtvaroufakis-recording.html [https://perma.cc/6LBA-LVVK] (archived Mar. 3, 2016)
(noting that the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras "is dealing with a revolt in his
own party over conditions that other Eurozone countries are demanding," and pointing
out that "Mr. Tsipras has been able to pass legislation demanded by creditors only with
the help of opposition parties").
21.
Jim Yardley, In a Twist, Europe May Find Itself Relying on Success of
Alexis Tsipras of Greece, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.comI2015/
08/22/world/europe/alexis-tsipras-greece-syriza-popular-unity.html [https://perma.cc/A7
8Z-58S8] (archived Mar. 3, 2016).
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Against this backdrop, those who demand Greece's exit from the
Eurozone have more on their mind than restoring Greece to economic
health. They also view Greece's continued membership as a potential
threat to the economic and monetary approach established by the
Eurozone, and they worry that repeated bailouts are clearing the way
for the Eurozone to become a "transfer union" in which economically
stronger states are forced to support weaker economies. 2 2 For them,
such an exit would have the advantage of ridding the Eurozone of a
country that may not only require future bailouts but also tempt
other member states into abandoning economic austerity, thereby
23
threatening the current order of the monetary union.
Of course, the crucial question is whether European law even
allows for a member state to be expelled from the Eurozone. The
potential ramifications of this question are enormous. What will
happen if no such expulsion is allowed? Will this lead some states to
continue to flout the restrictive rules of the Eurozone? Will the
Eurozone eventually collapse as more and more member states grow
accustomed to ever-expanding budget deficits and ever-increasing
government debt, thereby eroding trust in the stability of the common
24
currency?
And what will happen if a right to expel misbehaving member
states from the Eurozone is in fact recognized? Will this deter other
countries from joining the Eurozone in the first place for fear of later
suffering the humiliation of being kicked out? Will such an expulsion
inevitably destroy the European dream and fracture European unity
by pitting economically strong member states against their less
fortunate peers? Will it wreak havoc on the credibility of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)?2 5 Will such an expulsion mean
26
"the end for the euro"?

22.
Irwin, supra note 3 (noting fears that the Eurozone will turn into a
transfer union).
23.
Cf. Landon Thomas, Jr., In Eurozone, Growing Support for a Greek Exit,
Growing Support],
[hereinafter
Thomas,
18,
2015)
N.Y. TIMES (June
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19fbusiness/dealbook/greek-exit-from-euro-appearsincreasingly-likely.html [https://perma.c/8UCE-BCFK] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (noting
that "the view is taking hold in Europe that its ambitious currency project would be
better served if Greece just left," and pointing to German concerns that further bailouts
without budget cuts might bring the Eurozone closer to a "transfer union," where
stronger states economically support weaker ones).
24.
See, e.g., Horn, supra note 2, at 1403 (warning of the collapse of the
Eurozone).
25.
See Simon Nixon, Greece and Creditors Head for the Brink: Hardened
Positions Mean the Scope for Compromise Looks Vanishingly Small, WALL ST. J. (June
7, 2015, 5:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-and-creditors-head-for-the-brink1433712429 [https://perma.cc/EH8K-D7LH] (archived Mar. 3, 2016) (warning that "[i]f
Greece ends up leaving the eurozone, the IMF will find itself sitting on a giant loss,
which would devastate its credibility as the world's safest lender.").
See Simon Tisdall, Is Europe Dead?, CNN (June 29, 2015),
26.
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/19/opinions/is-europe-over-tisdall/ [https://perma.cc/M7K4-
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Interestingly, while the political and economic importance of a
Greek exit from the Eurozone--or "Grexit"-is widely recognized by
economists, 27 pundits, 28 and politicians, 29 legal scholars have largely
neglected the question of whether the European Union has the right
to expel member states from the Eurozone. To the extent that legal
scholars have even addressed the issue, they generally deny the
existence of an expulsion right but, in support for this claim, usually
limit themselves to pointing out that the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union does not mention any right to expel misbehaving
30
members.
This Article argues that this view is misguided. While expulsion
should be considered an ultima ratio limited to extreme situations, it
is unpersuasive as a matter of both black letter law and legal policy to
take it off the table entirely. To the extent that a right of expulsion is
needed to protect the functioning of the Eurozone-an unlikely but by
no means impossible scenario-such a right should not be denied.
None of this justifies calls for Greece's expulsion now. To the
contrary, this Article shows that conduct like that of the Greek
government does not come close to satisfying the conditions for
expelling a country from the Eurozone. Accordingly, opposition to
those voices who seek to expel Greece from the Eurozone is entirely
justified. However, this should not give rise to the opposite mistake of
denying the existence of an expulsion right entirely.
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part II explains the
background of the current economic and political crisis. Part III gives
an overview of various ways in which a member state might leave the
Eurozone other than by expulsion. Part IV argues that an expulsion
right should be recognized both as a matter of black letter law and as
a matter of legal policy. Part V summarizes and concludes.

II. BACKGROUND
The history of European monetary unification did not start with
the introduction of a common currency. Long before the euro was
introduced on January 1, 1999, most member states of the European
6EZD] (archived Feb. 17, 2016) (claiming that Greece's expulsion from the Eurozone
could spell the end of the euro).
27.
See, e.g., Economides et al., supra note 10 (warning that Greece's economic
crisis would become much worse if Greece were to leave the Eurozone).
28.
See, e.g., Barley, Testing the Market, supra note 11 (noting that the "ripple
effects of a Greek exit are hard to fathom."); Nixon, supra note 25 (noting that "the
stakes could not be higher.").
29.
See, e.g., Melissa Eddy & Jack Ewing, Conciliatory Notes in Germany on
Easing Greece's Burden, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/
23fbusiness/global/daily-euro- zone -watch.html [https://perma.cc/VP9E-697Y] (archived
Mar. 3, 2016) (quoting German Chancellor Angela Merkel as saying that "the future of
Europe" was tied to the question of whether Greece stayed in the Eurozone).
30.
See supra note 2.
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Union sought to stabilize their currency exchange rates by means of
the so-called European Monetary System (EMS). 3 1 At the core of
EMS, which was created in 1979, was the so-called Exchange Rate
32

Currency exchange rates were permitted to
fluctuate within certain narrow boundaries-usually 2.25 percent up
33
or down-but were otherwise fixed.
(ERM).

Mechanism

In practice, this system was not without limitations. Because the
economies of the member states developed differently over time, the
relevant

exchange

rates

had

to

be

adjusted-or

"realigned"-

regularly. 3 4 In addition, both the United Kingdom and Italy had to
withdraw

from

the

currencies

came

under

Exchange
too

Rate

Mechanism

35
much pressure;

because

and whereas

their
Italy

eventually returned to the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the United
36
Kingdom did not.
In any case, supporters of European integration had much loftier
goals than the mere stabilization of currency exchange rates; they
37
However, this project faced both
strove for a European currency.
political and economic obstacles, and an understanding of these
obstacles is crucial to comprehending the Eurozone's current crisis.
Political opposition to a common currency arose from the fact
that citizens in states with stable currencies were reluctant to

exchange

it

for a

common

European

currency

and

a

common

European monetary policy, which they feared might bring the high
inflation

rates

common

in

Southern

Europe.

38

This

fear

was

31.
Jens C. Dammann, The Right to Leave the Eurozone, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J.
125, 132 (2013) [hereinafter Dammann, Right to Leave]; cf. Roger J. Goebel, European
Economic and Monetary Union: Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249, 25862 (1998) (giving a short description of the European Monetary System).
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 140-41; Goebel, supra note
32.
31, at 259. When the Eurozone was created in 1999, the existing version of the
Exchange Rate Mechanism gave way to a new one, which permits exchange rates to
fluctuate 15 percent up or down. Resolution of the European Council of 16 June 1997
on the Establishment of a New Exchange-Rate Mechanism in the Third Stage of
2.1, 1997 O.J. (C 236) 5, http://ec.europa.euI
Economic and Monetary Union,
[https://perma.ccIH6NL-L9X4]
economy-finance/publications/publication6325_en.pdf
(archived Feb. 17, 2016).
JOHAN VAN OVERTVELDT, THE END OF THE EURO: THE UNEASY FUTURE OF
33.
THE EUROPEAN UNION 26 (2011); Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 141.
34.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 141; Goebel, supra note 31, at
261.
35.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 141; Goebel, supra note 31, at
261.
Dammann, Right to Leave supra note 31, at 141.
36.
See VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 33, at 30 (noting that the 1989 Delors
37.
plan, named after the then-President of the European Commission Jacques Delors,
contemplated the creation of a single currency as an option for the final stage of the
European Monetary Union). The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht then called for a single
currency as the final stage of the European Monetary Union. Id. at 33.
38.
Cf. Edmund L. Andrews & Steven Erlanger, Euro Deposes the Mark,
Grieving Many Germans, N.Y. TIMES (August 30, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
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particularly pronounced in Germany, a country that had experienced
hyperinflation after both World War I and World War II and whose
citizens were therefore particularly
39
currency for a soft one.

afraid of exchanging

a

hard

To allay German fears of inflation, the member states went out
of their way to design a

European monetary system that would
address this concern, and as a result, European constitutional law
imposes much more rigid strictures on monetary policy than U.S.
40
federal law, let alone U.S. constitutional law, does.
To begin with, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union 41

explicitly provides that the European Central Bank must
42
focus primarily on price stability in fashioning its monetary policy,
a principle often referred to as the "primacy of price stability." 4 3 This
principle stands in obvious contrast to other areas of European law,
where institutions can choose between a broad range of policy goals
and weigh them according to political expediency. 4 4 It also contrasts
quite vividly with U.S. law, since the Federal Reserve is authorized to
balance the goal of stable prices with other competing policy goals,
including "maximum employment" and "moderate long-term interest
45

rates."
Moreover, in order to become part of the Eurozone, a member
state first has to meet the so-called convergence criteria. 4 6 These

08/30/worldleuro-deposes-the-mark- grieving- many- germans.html [https://perma.cc/G95
3-CKS5] (archived Feb. 17, 2016) (noting that attitudes towards the introduction of the
euro varied strongly across European countries and that Germans were particularly
concerned about replacing their highly stable Deutsche Mark).
39.
See, e.g., HORST KRATZMANN, Der Staatsbankrott [Sovereign Default], 37
JURISTENZEITUNG [J.Z.] 319, 320-21 (1982) (providing a brief summary of Germany's
experience with inflation in the Weimar Republic and after World War 1I).
40.
Cf. Christian Kersting, Combating the Financial Crisis: European and
German Corporateand Securities Laws and the Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors'
Privileges, 48 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269, 293 (2013) (pointing out that the European Union's
rigid commitment to price stability was "Germany's condition for agreeing to enter the
euro").
41.
See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 238(3), Dec. 13, 2007, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
42.
Id. art. 127(1) (providing that the "primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks ...shall be to maintain price stability.").
43.
E.g., Jens Dammann, The Banking Union: flawed by Design, 45 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 1057, 1076 (2014) [hereinafter Dammann, Flawed by Design].
44.
Jens Dammann, MATERIELLES RECHT UND BEWEISRECHT IM SYSTEM DER
GRUNDFREIHEITEN [SUBSTANTIvE LAW AND EVIDENTIARY RULES IN THE LAW OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS] 222 (2007) (noting that the European Court of Justice has
repeatedly stressed the political discretion that the European institutions have in
balancing the various goals set by the Treaties).
45.
12 U.S.C. § 225a (2014).
46.
The convergence criteria are listed in Article 140 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], and fleshed out in the so-called
"Convergence Protocol" annexed to the TFEU. TFEU, supra note 41, art. 140 (listing
the convergence criteria); Protocol (No. 13) on the Convergence Criteria, 2010 O.J.
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criteria include, inter alia, a high degree of price stability, stable
currency exchange rates, the sustainability of the government's
47
financial position, as well as stable long-term interest-rate levels.
Of particular practical importance is the second one of these
requirements. Under this criterion, a country's total government debt
must not exceed 60 percent of GDP, and the budget deficit must not
48
be more than 3 percent of GDP.
To enforce even greater fiscal discipline, the member states
entered into the so-called Stability and Growth Pact. 4 9 The Stability
and Growth Pact effectively perpetuates the convergence criteria by
requiring each member state to stay within the limits on government
debt and budget deficits described above even after joining the
Eurozone. 50 Moreover, the requirements of the Stability and Growth
Pact are accompanied by a regime of escalating interventions,
culminating in the imposition of fines of up to 0.5 percent of a
51
member state's GDP.
In addition to these various legal mechanisms designed to
safeguard monetary stability, the European Union took the
symbolically important step of locating the European Central Bank in
Frankfurt, the same city that is home to the Bundesbank, Germany's
equivalent of the Federal Reserve. 52 In the end, Germany was ready
to part with the Deutsche Mark, thereby creating the political
53
consensus necessary for a common European currency.
Of course, there were also challenges of an economic nature. The
European Union simply did not satisfy the economic requirements for

(C83) 281 [hereinafter Convergence Protocol] (providing more detailed rules on the
meaning and application of the convergence criteria).
47.
TFEU, supra note 41, art. 140(1).
See Convergence Protocol, supra note 46.
48.
49.
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and Growth Pact, 1997
O.J. (C 236) 1, 2 [hereinafter SGP Resolution]. The stability and growth pact actually
consists of the Resolution on the Stability and Growth Pact and two regulations. See id.
at III. These two regulations are Council Regulation 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the
Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and
Coordination of Economic Policies, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 [hereinafter Council Regulation
1466/97], and Council Regulation 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on Speeding Up and
Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit Procedure, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6
[hereinafter Council Regulation 1467/97].
See SGP Resolution, supra note 49.
50.
51.
See Council Regulation 1467/97, supra note 49, art. 12 (authorizing the
imposition of fines of up to 0.5 percent of GDP).
52.
Protocol (No. 6) on the Location of the Seats of the Institutions and of
Certain Bodies, Offices, Agencies, and Departments of the European Union, 2012 O.J.
(C 326) 287.
53.
It has sometimes been suggested that Germany's willingness to embrace
the euro may also have been due to pressure exerted by the French government.
Allegedly, French President Franqois Mitterrand threatened to derail German
unification unless Germany consented to a European monetary union. VAN
OVERTVELDT, supra note 33, at 32.
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a successful common currency 5 4 that the literature on optimal
currency areas had developed. 5 5 In particular, the member states
remained in charge of fiscal policy, 56 the general level of political
integration remained low, 57 and the same was true for interstate
labor mobility. 58 Not surprisingly, therefore, many economists were
59
pessimistic regarding the Eurozone's future.
In the end, these economic reservations were set aside; on
January 1, 1999, eleven member states of the European Union,
including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, switched from their
national currencies to the euro. 60 Only two years later, Greece
followed. 6 1 Since then, seven other member states have joined the
Eurozone, which is now comprised of nineteen of the European
62
Union's twenty-eight member states.
In the first years after the introduction of the euro, the new
currency seemed to refute its skeptics. 63 Predictions that the euro
might become a soft currency failed to come to pass. Rather, inflation
64
remained low, and the euro held its own vis-A-vis other currencies.
Moreover, those member states that had had soft currencies before
introducing the euro were now able to borrow at the low rates
previously reserved for more stable economies. 6 5 For some of these
member states, the result was rapid growth. 6 6 This was particularly
true for Greece, whose economy expanded dramatically after it joined

54.
Dammann, Right to Leave supra note 31, at 127.
55.
In particular, see the groundbreaking work of Robert A. Mundell. See
Robert A. Mundell, A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 657
(1961).
56.
MICHAEL HEINE & HANSJORG HERR, DIE EuRoPAiSCHE ZENTRALBANK 206
(2004); Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 127.
57.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 127.
58.
VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 33, at 61-62.
59.
See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European
Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability, 11 J. ECON.
PERSP. 23 (1997).
60.
Council Regulation 974/98 of 3 May 1998 on the Introduction of the Euro,
Annex, 1998 O.J. (L 139).
61.
Council Regulation 2596/2000 of 27 November 2000 Amending Regulation
974/98 on the Introduction of the Euro, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 300) 2.
62.
Lehte Roots, Tanel Kerikmde & Sandra Sdrav, Article 139 TFEU on
Derogations for Member States Without Euro, in SMIT & HERZOG ON THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION § 139.03 (Hans Smit et al. eds., 2015).
63.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 127.
64.
See Wilhelm Hankel et al., The Euro-Project at Risk (ZEI, Working Paper
No.
B04-2010,
2010),
http://econstor.eufbitstream/1O419/46218/1/638549396.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HF5R-4K3Q] (archived Feb. 18, 2016).
65.
Floyd Norris, While Germany Prospers, Unemployment Strangles Others,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/in-euro-zonegermany-prospers-while-unemployment-strangles-others.html?-r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z
J79-CE2D] (archived Mar. 5, 2016).
66.
See id.
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the Eurozone: In 2000, the year before Greece was admitted to the
Eurozone, its per capita GDP was $11,961.67 By 2008, the year that
the financial crisis began, Greek per capita GDP had risen to
$31,700.68 During that same time, Greek government debt stayed
fairly stable as a percentage of GDP. 6 9 Thus, in 2000, Greek national
debt was 108.9 percent of GDP and rose to only 110.6 percent by
2008.70

Not surprisingly, therefore, the euro was widely hailed as a
stunning success. 7 1 Indeed, in 2008, shortly before the financial crisis
broke, the Chief European Economist at Goldman Sachs, Erik
Nielsen, declared that "the Euro and the Euro-zone economy have all
of a success, including .
of financial stability." 72
degree
unprecedented
the

hallmarks

.

contributing

to an

However, the financial crisis of 2008 proved that such initial

enthusiasm had been too sanguine. In Europe, the financial crisis of
2008 quickly turned into a sovereign debt crisis as investors grew
fearful that some of the more economically fragile member statesparticularly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain-might no
longer be able to shoulder their debts. 7 3 By 2010, Greece was on the
verge

of insolvency. 7 4 European

institutions, in

cooperation

with

67.
World Development Indicators: Greece, THE WORLD BANK (2016),
http://databank.worldbank.org/data [http://perma.cceY7HQ-JMH3] (archived Feb. 16,
2016).
68.
Id.
69.
Central Government Debt, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD],
https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=8089 [http://perma.cc/LLT3-RCLV] (archived
Feb. 16, 2016).
70.
Id.
71.
See, e.g., Central Bank of Europe Leaves Rates Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/20O2/O1/O4fbusiness/central-bank-of-europeleaves-rates-unchanged.html [https://perma.cc/UJC6-KUKY] (archived Mar. 6, 2016)
(citing Wim Duisenberg, the first president of the European Central Bank, who called
the introduction of the euro "a tremendous success"); Norris, supra note 65 (noting that
the euro originally appeared to be "a great success for what are now called the
peripheral countries of the euro zone"). Even after the beginning of the financial crisis,
some of the initial enthusiasm for the euro remained. See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish, No
Fireworks for Euro as It Reaches the 10-Year Mark, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/world/europe/euro-is-10-years-old-but-few-are-cele
brating.html [https://perma.ccfB36A-B9JMI (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that "[b]y
many measures, the euro has been a success.").
72.
VAN OVERTVELDT, supra note 33, at 78 (citing GOLDMAN SACHS, THE EURO
AT TEN: PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES FOR THE NEXT DECADE 200 (2008)).
73.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 127-28; Landon Thomas, Jr.,
The Worst May Not Be over for Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2009), http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31business/global/3 leuro.html?mtrref=www.google.com&m
trref=www.nytimes.com&-r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y8LK-Y3T7] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
74.
See John Crace, The Greek Debt Crisis, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2015), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2015/j un/23/the-greek-debt-crisis-digested-read
[https://
perma.cc/DAA5-LFUK] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that as of 2010, credit agencies
downgraded Greek government bonds to junk bond status based on a possible
sovereign default); Catherine Rampell, Greece's Debt Crisis is Far from a Resolution, to
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member state governments and the IMF, managed to prevent that
75
outcome via a 110 billion euro rescue package adopted in May 2010.
However, the financial crisis escalated further, resulting in bailouts
for Ireland (2010),76 Portugal (2011), 77 Greece (2012), 78 Spain
(2012), 79 and Cyprus (2012).80
Most of the countries that received bailouts later regained their
footing, but Greece proved the exception to the rule: Having quickly
expanded between 2000 and 2008,81 the Greek economy now seemed
82
to unravel. By 2011, Greek unemployment exceeded 20 percent,
and, in that same year, the Greek economy shrank by almost 7

Judge from History, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/catherine-rampell greeces-debt-crisis is-far-from-a-resolution-to-judge-from-hi
story/2015/01/12/8e33la0c-9a9c- 11e4-96cc-e858eba9lced story.html [https://perma.cc/
L3CE-KQU6] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that in 2010, the so-called Troika-the
IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission-saved Greece from sovereign default).
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 128; James Kanter & Judy
75.
Dempsey, Europe Approves Rescue for Debt-Ridden Greece, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2010),
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9AODEEDB1130F93BA35756COA9669
D8B63 [https://perma.cc/T435-VVDU] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
76.
Stephen Castle & Liz Alderman, Europe Approves Irish Rescue and New
Rules on Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/
business/global/29euro.html [https://perma.cc/PVS3-XCW9] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
77.
Patricia Kowsmann, PortugalBailout Plan Detailed, WALL ST. J. (May 5,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703937104576302883922114642
[https://perma.cc/QV57-83C5] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
Min Zeng, Treasurys Bounce Back, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at B14.
78.
The Spanish government originally refused to ask for a direct bailout and
79.
instead demanded that any bailout money should be provided directly to troubled
Spanish banks. See Charles Forelle & David Enrich, Bulls Retreat on Spain Bailout
Plan: Global Markets Reverse Early Gains as Investor Confidence Wanes, WALL ST. J.
(June 12, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBI000142405270230376810
4577460442153217320 [https://perma.ccV953-4HFS] (archived Mar. 6, 2016). That
way, the bailout would not have created government liability, and therefore would not
have increased Spain's government debt. See id. However, the other member states of
the Eurozone did not consent to such a direct bailout and successfully insisted on
granting the money to the Spanish government instead. See, e.g., Dammann, Flawed
by Design, supra note 43, at 1072 n.88; Raphael Minder, Bailout in Spain Leaves
Taxpayers Liable for the Cost, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.comI
2012/06/13/business/global/baiout-in-spain-leaves-taxpayers-holding-the-bag.htmI [htt
ps://perma.cc/X7L4-66BF] (archived Mar. 6, 2016); Raphael Minder & Paul Geitner,
Pressed to Seek a Bailout, Spain Assesses the Needs of Its Banks, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2012), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403EODC1330F93AA35755CO
A9649D8B63&pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/6VB8-5V4Y] (archived Mar. 6, 2016);
Gabriele Steinhauser, Euro Zone Turmoil: Continental Drift Adds to Challenge-With
Crisis Deepening, Europe's Changing Cast of Leaders Demonstrates Little Rapport as
G-20 Meeting Gets Under Way, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2012, at A6.
80.
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bank Levy in Cyprus, and Why Not to Worry, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013, 8:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/a-bank-levyin-cyprus-and-why/ [https://perma.cc/T3DE-9MJQ] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
81.
See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
82.
William Horobin et al., Jobless Rates Jump in France, Greece, WALL ST. J.
(June 7, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303753904
577451933202241876 [https://perma.cc/2D9M-ADN8] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
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percent. 8 3 Part of the problem may have been that the 2010 bailout
came with stringent conditions attached; in particular, it required
Greece to curtail its budget. 84 These conditions aimed at committing
Greece to financial austerity were highly controversial: many argued
that austerity made an already disastrous economic situation
worse.85
In
2012,

to

stave

off

financial

collapse,

the

European

Commission, the IMF, and the European Central Bank-collectively
known as the "Troika"-granted a second rescue package, this time to
the tune of 130 billion euros. 86 Like the first one, it was tied to
further budget cuts. 8 7 This second rescue package went hand in hand
with a painstakingly negotiated partial government default: in March
2012, the private owners of Greek government bonds accepted a bond
swap 88 that reduced their claims against the Greek government by
53.5 percent. 89 By way of this so-called "haircut," the total amount of
government debt cut was 107 billion euro. 90 The idea behind this
haircut was to make Greece's debt more manageable and also to
ensure that the bailouts did not simply enrich Greece's private
creditors at the expense of European taxpayers.
Even after the second bailout and the 2012 haircut, however, the
situation remained very difficult. By the end of 2014, Greek per
capita GDP had shrunk to $21,863, and government debt had

83.
Landon Thomas, Jr., As Greece's Debt Plan Nears, Concerns About Bond
Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/15fbusiness/
[https://perma.cc/XF64global/greece-expected-to-offer-debt-holders-a-deal-soon.html
KAXV] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 128.
84.
8,
2012),
TIMES
(Feb.
Tragedy,
N.Y.
See
Greek
85.
[https://perma.cc/YG9
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/09/opinion/greek-tragedy.html
W-6DPH] (archived Mar. 6, 2016); Kicking the Can: Without Debt Relief, Greece Can't
Grow and the Crisis Won't End, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
(archived Mar. 6,
2011/06/07/opinionl07tue2.html [https://perma.cc/5VMY-L4GY]
2016).
86.
David Jolly, Greek Economy Shrank 6.2% in Second Quarter, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 2012), http:/www.nytimes.com/2l2/08/14/business/globalgreek-economyshrank-dramatically- in-2nd- quarter.html [https://perma.cc/6XNV-9JET] (archived Mar.
6, 2016).
See Liz Alderman, In Greece, Restlessness Amid a Push for Cuts, N.Y.
87.
TIMES (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/18lbusiness/global/in-greecegrowing-restlessness-amid-push-for-cuts.html [https:H/perma.cc/4XDQ-FT8D] (archived
Mar. 6, 2016).
88.
Stephen Fidler, Despite Pact, Unease Lingers for Greece, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
9
22, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020335870457723653213591
Mar.
6,
2016).
(archived
266 [https://perma.cc/TV64-VZF5]
89.
Id.; Marcus Walker, How a Radical Greek Rescue Plan Fell Short, WALL
ST. J. (May 10, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023042
03604577393964198652568 [https://perma.cc/Y9VB-D2TC] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
Fidler, supra note 88.
90.
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ballooned to 177.1 percent of GDP. 91 Perhaps even more importantly,
unemployment reached 26.5 percent. 92 Younger workers were hit
especially hard, with unemployment rates for workers under twentyfive years soaring to 52.5 percent. 93 As with the first bailout, many
critics believed that the austerity measures imposed by the Troika
contributed to Greece's economic decline by forcing Greece to cut
94
government spending in the middle of a downturn.
The year 2014 finally brought some good news. Greece's GDP
started growing again, showing an expansion of 0.8 percent 9 5 after
having shrunk 3.9 percent the year before. 96 In addition, the Greek
government regained access to the bond market, which it had
previously lost.9 7 However, by this time, Greece's citizens had
thoroughly lost their appetite for more austerity policies.
Parliamentary elections in 2014 meant the end of the center-right
government that had supported, nolens volens, the Troika's austerity
policies. 98 The strongest party to emerge from the election was the
Coalition of the Radical Left, better known under its acronym
SYRIZA, with 26.5 percent of the vote. 99 After the election, the Greek
parliament failed to elect a new prime minister, leading the
parliament to be dissolved and snap elections to be called for the

91.
European Comm'n, General Government Gross Debt-Annual Data,
EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init= l&language=en&
pcode=teina225&plugin=l [http://perma.cc/7GMV-4S4X] (archived Feb. 16, 2016).
92.
European Comm'n, Unemployment Statistics, EU7RoSTAT (Jan. 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.phpUnemployment-statistics
[http://perma.cc/MW9U-X6C9] (archived Feb. 16, 2016).
93.
Id.
94.
See e.g., Irwin, supra note 3; Krugman, supra note 7; cf. Andrew Ross
Sorkin, The Hard Line on Greece, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
[https://perma.cc/4VGA2015/06/30/business/dealbook/the-hard-line-on-greece.html
EFPQ] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (reporting economist Joseph Stiglitz's condemnation of
the economics behind the troika's austerity policies as "abysmal").
95.
David Jolly, Eurozone Growth Exceeds Expectations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/14fbusiness/eurozone-growth-exceeds-expectati
ons.html [https://perma.cc/CVW4-W595] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
96.
European Comm'n, National Accounts and GDP, EUROSTAT (May 2015),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/National-accounts-and.GDP
[http://perma.cc/LT6S-SCVX] (archived Feb. 16, 2016).
97.
Hugo Dixon, No Veering on Greece's Path to Redemption, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/23/business/international/no-veering-on(archived Feb. 16,
greeces-path-to-redemption.html [http://perma.cc/9DDC-2GR8]
2016).
See id. (noting that Greek prime minster Samaras stuck to a harsh reform
98.
program for two years).
99.
Alexia Kafalas, Grce:"Le Succs de la Gauche Radicale aux Europdnnes,
LE FIGARO (May 26, 2014), http://www.lefigaro.fr/elections/europeennes-2014/2014/
05/26/01053-20140526ARTFIG00027-grece-le-succes-de-la-gauche-radicale-aux-europe
nnes.php [https://perma.cc/C5F6-CPDC] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
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beginning of 2015.100 This time around, SYRIZA managed to gather
10 1
36.3 percent of the vote and 149 out of 300 parliamentary seats.
And while this was slightly short of a parliamentary majority,
SYRIZA overcame this problem by coalescing with the ultra right10 2
wing Independent Greeks.
SYRIZA and its new prime minister Alexis Tsipras had won the
election by campaigning against the austerity policies imposed by the
Troika. 10 3 It is therefore unsurprising that the new government
dragged its heels on the implementation of various reforms promised
by the previous government and even reversed some cuts already
undertaken by the previous government. 104 For example, previously
05
laid-off civil servants were reemployed.1
The Troika reacted by suspending the payment of outstanding
aid and refusing to make further payment until the Greek
government promised to honor the existing bailout agreement, or
until some other compromise was reached. 10 6 The subsequent failure
to reach such a compromise resulted in acute liquidity problems for
the Greek government and eroded the financial markets' trust in the
ability of the Greek government to pay back Greece's debt. 10 7 By
February 2015, yields of ten-year government bonds soared to over 10

100.
See Alkman Granitsas, Greek Opposition Still Holds Slim Lead in Polls
Before Election, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greekopposition-still-holds- slim -lead-in-polls-before -elections- 1420661426 [https://perma.cc/4
9Y4-CCL8] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
101.
Daphne Halikiopoulou, Greek Crisis: As Greece Spirals Towards Disaster,
a New Era of Extremist Politics Begins, INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2015), http://www.in
dependent.co.uk/voices/comment/greek-referendum-as-greece-spirals-towards-disaster[http://perma.cc/B3WZ-VLFQ]
a -new-era -of-extremist-politics-begins- 10368012.html
(archived Feb. 16, 2016).
102.
See Richard Barley, Election Sees Greece Climb Back in the Ring with
Eurozone, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2015, at C8.
See Suzanne Daley, Greeks Reject Bailout Terms in Rebuff to European
103.
Leaders, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2015), http:/lwww.nytimes.com2015/07/O6/world/europel
greek- referendum-debt-crisis-vote.html [https://perma.cc/4JZQ-SXCM] (archived Mar.
6, 2016).
104.
See Stelios Bouras, Greece Rehires Laid Off Cleaners as Syriza Reverses
Austerity, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2015, 1:58 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-gov
ernment-agrees -to -rehire-cleaners- 1431367128 [https:f/perma.ccUL3J-3B8A] (archived
Mar. 6, 2016).
105.
Id. (noting that SYRIZA was rehiring 3,900 government workers laid off by
the previous government).
See Andrew Higgins & James Kanter, Fears of Greek Debt Default
106.
Overshadow European Union Gathering, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/2O/world/europe/greece-debt-default-european-union.html
[https://perma.cc/72TD-JXQU] (archived Mar. 6, 2016); David Jolly & Neil Gough,
European Stocks Shrug off FalteringTalks on Greek Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2015, at
B1.
107.
Cf. Greece's Debt Crisis Explained, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/20 15fbusiness/internationalgreece-debt-crisis -euro.html (last updated Nov.
19, 2015) [http://perma.cc/2AFE-TWMF] (archived Feb. 16, 2016) (reporting that the
"bailout program has hit snags").
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percent, 10 8 and, by May, it had once again become impossible for
Greece to satisfy its need for liquidity on the bond market. 109
Meanwhile, the Greek government continued to negotiate with
representatives of the Troika and other member states. 1 10 These
negotiations grew increasingly tense as there was a widespread sense
that a compromise had to be found by the end of June at the latest to
prevent Greece from defaulting on its sovereign debt. 11 1
It did not help that the Greek finance minister referred to foreign
creditors as "terrorists"

112

or that the Greek government, in turn, was

accused in the press of "behaving like clowns." 1 13 The atmosphere
became

one

of

mutual

distrust. 1 1 4

Greece

became

increasingly

isolated during the negotiations and at some point was even excluded
from them. 1 15 At the end of June 2015, following months of
negotiations, the other member states as well as the Troika finally
presented Greece with a comprehensive bailout proposal, whose
terms they felt were very generous to Greece. The Greek government,

however,

declared

the

proposal

unacceptable

intention to hold a referendum within a week.

and

declared

its

1 16

By this point, the situation in Greece had become dramatic.
Anticipating a Greek return to the drachma and a forced conversion

of savings placed with Greek banks, Greek citizens had been
withdrawing billions of euros from their bank accounts, thereby
depriving Greek banks of much-needed liquidity. 117 To avoid a

108.
Christopher Whittall, Greece's Troubles Barely Ripple Its Neighbors, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2015, 1:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greeces-troublbs-barelycause-a-ripple-1424370598 [https://perma.cc/LVM8-B8GX] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
109.
See Christopher Whittall & Tommy Stubbington, Trading in Greek
Government Bonds Slows to a Trickle, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2015, 4:28 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/trading-in-greek-government-bonds-slows-to-a-trickle1430684909 [https://perma.cc/75E6-CXW2] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
110.
James Kanter & Niki Kitsantonis, Greece's Tense Talks with Its Creditors
Escalate to the Next Phase, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
[https://perma.cc/AV2T-24MS]
03/10/business/greece-eurozone-finance-ministers.html
(archived Mar. 6, 2016).
111.
See Marcus Walker, Greek CreditorsMove to Draw Line in Sand, WALL ST.
J., June 8, 2015, at A8.
112.
See Andrew Higgins & James Kanter, Greece Given Until Sunday to Settle
Debt Crisis or Face Disaster, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/08business/internationallgreece-debt-eurozone -meeting.html [https://perma.cc/2CG
H-52HC] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
Tisdall, supra note 26.
113.
114.
See Niki Kitsantonis & James Kanter, Greece Requests a 3-Year Loan but
Is Vague on Its FinancialPlans, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/09/business/international/tsipras-greece-debt.html [https:H!perma.ccB3W6-MN
BY] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
115.
See Irwin, supra note 3.
116.
Daley, supra note 103.
117.
See Josie Cox, Greek Stocks Fall 16% as Trading Resumes After Five-Week
Closure, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-stocks-fall-as-
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complete collapse of its banks, which were quickly running out of
cash, the Greek government ordered the banks to shut down
temporarily, imposed capital controls, and limited cash withdrawals
to sixty euros per person per day. 118 The Athens Stock Market was
19
closed entirely. 1
Blaming austerity policies for the country's economic decline, the
Greek government campaigned against the bailout proposal, and, on
the day of the referendum, a clear majority of Greeks rejected the
proposed bailout agreement in what was generally perceived to be an
120
important victory for the Greek prime minister and SYRIZA.
Nonetheless, the Greek finance minister resigned. 12 1 Allegedly, this
occurred at the request of Prime Minister Tsipras, who had been
looking for a reason to replace Varoufakis for some time and found
one when Varoufakis mused aloud about the possibility of introducing
the drachma as a parallel currency. 122 Meanwhile, the Greek
government returned to the negotiating table with the declared
intention of reaching a more generous agreement. 12 3 That hope,
however, proved illusory. In the end, the Greek government found
itself forced to accept essentially the same deal that had already been
on the table, with the added burden that the amount of the bailout
and the resulting Greek debt was even higher, since the delay caused
by the referendum had done substantial damage to the Greek
24
banking system. 1
To this day, the situation in Greece remains challenging.
National insolvency has been avoided for now, but the outlook is
grim. For one thing, it is not clear that Tsipras will be able to
trading-resumes -after-five-week-exchange-closure- 1438589547 [https://perma.cc/95RT5JP6] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
Higgins, Setting a Deadline, supra note 3.
118.
Jonathon Hopkins, Foreign Troubles Hurt Travel Firms, DAILY MAIL, June
119.
30, 2015, at 70.
120.
See Daley, supra note 103 (describing the no vote in the referendum as a
"sweeping victory [for] Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras").
Stelios Bouras & Nektaria Stamouli, Greek Finance Minister Yanis
121.
Varoufakis Resigns After Referendum, WALL ST. J. (July 6, 2015, 2:44 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-finance-minister-yanis-varoufakis-resigns-afterreferendum- 1436162284 [https://perma.cc/7JN3-X8X7] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
See id.
122.
Apparently, the Greek prime minister assumed that the no vote would
123.
increase his bargaining power. See, e.g., Daley, supra note 103; Anna Sauerbrey,
European PoliticalPoker, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/
10/opinionanna-sauerbrey-european- political-poker.html [http://perma.cc/6LNZ-L4RR]
(archived Feb. 16, 2016).
See Liz Alderman, With Greek 'No'Vote, Tsipras Wins a Victory That
124.
Could Carry a Steep Price, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
0 7/06/world/europe/with-no-greek-vote-tsipras-wins -a-victory-that-could-carry-a-steepprice.html [https://perma.cc/XRX7-5CHL] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that the
bailout package subject to the referendum was no longer on offer, that the economy had
"worsened drastically amid the political and financial chaos," and that "the imposition
of capital controls at Greek banks since Mr. Tsipras's call for a referendum may have
doubled or tripled the cost of any new bailout").
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implement the 2015 bailout agreement. Given his own campaign
against austerity measures, many members of his own party appear
reluctant to support the strictures imposed by the new bailout
deal, 12 5 and some members of SYRIZA are openly calling for a return
to the drachma. 126 Even Prime Minister Tsipras' success in the
referendum is proving to be a double-edged sword, as his critics now
lambast him for agreeing to a deal that is even more burdensome for
Greece than the terms on which he called the referendum and that
12 7
the Greeks rejected by a clear majority.
Setting aside these political hurdles, it is not clear how the 2015
bailout will help Greece exit the deep depression in which it now finds
itself. 12 8 The newest data suggest that the Greek economy may have
grown slightly in 2015,129 but this is attributed to "panic purchases":
when the Greek government limited cash withdrawals to sixty euros
per person per day, many Greek citizens used their debits cards to
purchase consumer and other goods that they did not need for fear
that Greece might reintroduce the drachma and that any money left
in their checking accounts would be converted into the new national
currency and lose much of its value. 130 Hence, Greece's economic
situation remains very difficult. There is furthermore a widespread
sense among economists that cutting spending in a downturn-which
the Greek government will have to do if it wants to implement the
bailout conditions to which it has now agreed-is likely to make
matters worse. 13 1 Moreover, it is not clear how willing Greek
lawmakers are to adopt reforms that tackle some of the country's
more insidious systemic problems, such as widespread corruption and
tax evasion. 132
As Greece's economic difficulties persist, so do speculations that
the country will be forced to leave the Eurozone. 13 3 This threat was

125.
See Ewing & Kitsantonis, supra note 20.
126.
See Niki Kitsantonis, Tsipras Seeks to Avert Party Split as Greece's
Creditors Arrive for Talks, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/30/business/international/tsipras-seeks-to-avert-party-split-as-greeces-creditorsarrive-for-talks.html [http://perma.cc/SZA3-ZYDY] (archived Feb. 16, 2016).
127.
See id.
128.
See Alderman, Tentative Greek Accord, supra note 9.
129.
Marcus Walker & Stelios Bouras, Dismal Debt Outlook for Greece Raises
Pressure on European Creditors, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2015, 7:37 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/dismal-debt-outlook-for-greece-raises-pressure-on-european-creditors1439491731 [https://perma.cc/6ZKD-E8YE] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
130.
Griechenlands Wirtschaft Wdchst V5llig Uberraschend,DIE WELT (Aug.13,
2015), http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article145185125/Griechenlands-Wirtschaft-waec
hst-voellig-ueberraschend.html [https://perma.cc/RDK5-CFEF]
(archived Feb. 16,
2016).
131.
See Irwin, supra note 3.
132.
See Alderman, Tentative Greek Accord, supra note 9.
133.
See, e.g., Stephan-Andreas Casdorff, Die Politik Steht vor Horrenden
Aufgaben, DER TAGESSPIEGEL (Jan. 9, 2016), http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/was-
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perhaps greatest when the Greeks voted "No" in their July
referendum. 134 Immediately before the referendum, various EU
officials as well as leaders from other member states had given subtle
and not-so-subtle hints that a negative vote would mean that Greece
.would have to leave the Eurozone, 135 prompting Janis Varoufakis,
then Greece's prime minister, to threaten legal action if an expulsion
were attempted. 136 Many pundits took it as given that a no-vote
13 7
might lead to Greece's expulsion from the Eurozone.
While the Greek prime minister's return to the negotiating table
after the referendum may have avoided such an outcome for the time
being, the option of involuntary expulsion remains on the table.
Leading politicians in various member states have called on Greece to
leave the Eurozone at least temporarily, 138 with the most vocal
proponent of this idea being the German Finance Minister, Wolfgang
Schauble. 139 Moreover, an increasing number of governments already
face substantial opposition to the 2015 bailout from their own
voters. 140 Against this backdrop, should the 2015 bailout fail to revive
the Greek economy or should Greece fail to implement the bailout
agreement, then calls to force Greece out of the Eurozone are likely to
become overwhelming.

III.

LEAVING THE EUROZONE WITHOUT BEING EXPELLED

Before addressing the possibility of an involuntary exit from the
Eurozone, it will be helpful to briefly analyze other possible
[https://perma,
fuer-ein-jahr-die-politik-steht-vor-horrenden-aufgaben/12810994.html
cc/5GVG-A2YVI (archived Feb. 16, 2016) (arguing that the Grexit remains possible).
134.
Cf.Daley, supra note 103 (describing the no vote and noting the possibility
that Greece might face expulsion from the Eurozone or even the European Union as a
result).
See Evans -Pritchard, supra note 5 (reporting that both French President
135.
Franqois Hollande and the head of the German social -democratic party, Sigmar
Gabriel, had made it clear that a no vote in the Greek referendum would mean leaving
the Eurozone).
136.
Id.
See, e.g., Annie Correal & Colleen Wright, Greeks in New York Talk and
137.
Cheer, Then Debate Future After Referendum, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/07/06/world/greeks-in-new-york-talk-and-cheer-then-debate-futureafter-referendum.html [https://perma.ce/N2WA-AF3J] (archived Mar. 6, 2016); Daley,
supra note 103.
See, e.g., Ewing & Kitsantonis, supra note 20; Higgins & Kanter, supra
138.
note 112; Irwin, supra note 3 (noting that Slovenia was the first member state to
propose a temporary Greek exit from the Eurozone).
See Irwin, supra note 3.
139.
Slovakia, a coalition government fell because of its
See id. (noting that "[i]n
140.
support for a previous Greek bailout," and that in Finland, one of the parties in the
governing coalition is opposed any concessions to Greece, and reporting that German
public opinion "strongly" favored a Grexit); see also Higgins, Setting a Deadline, supra
note 3 (noting that German Chancellor Angela Merkel is facing increasing resistance to
further bailouts).
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circumstances of exit. These include an amendment to the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union, a unilateral withdrawal from
the European Union, or, more controversially, a unilateral
withdrawal from the Eurozone. This Part will address these
possibilities in turn.
A. Exit by Treaty Amendment
One option that would allow Greece--or any other member
state-to leave the Eurozone while staying in the European Union
would be to amend the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union. 141 By universal agreement, the member states remain the
"masters of the treaties" and are therefore free to amend the
treaties. 142 Hence, one could complement the relevant rules with an
explicit right to leave the Eurozone or with an explicit expulsion
right. For example, one could provide that, once a member state's
total government debt exceeds a certain level relative to the member
state's GDP, the other member states can expel that member state by
unanimous resolution.
Alternatively, one could amend the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union on a case-by-case basis and simply include
special rules for individual member states such as Greece. After all,
there are already two member states, the United Kingdom and
Denmark, that are subject to special treatment vis-A-vis the
introduction of the euro: unlike other member states, which are under
an obligation to join the Eurozone once they fulfill the relevant
preconditions, 143 both the United Kingdom and Denmark have
reserved the right to stay outside the Eurozone, 144 and, so far, both
countries have made full use of that right.
However, amending the Treaties is a rather challenging task.
Every single member state would have to sign and ratify such an
amendment. 145 Given that the European Union now has twenty-eight
different member states, 146 a unanimous consensus is rather difficult
to achieve. In any case, given that the current Greek government is

141.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 132.
142.
The Treaty on European Union even contains a procedure for amending
the Treaties. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 48, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83/13) [hereinafter TEU].
143.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 138.
144.
Protocol (No. 16) on Certain Provisions Relating to Denmark, 2008 O.J. (C
83) 287; Protocol (No. 15) on Certain Provisions Relating to the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 2008 O.J. (C 83) 284 [hereinafter Protocol (No.
15)].
145.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 132.
146.
E.g., Freya Baetens et al., DeterminingInternationalResponsibility Under
the New Extra-EU Investment Agreements: What Foreign Investors in the EU Should
Know, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1203, 1212 n.34 (2014).
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firmly opposed to leaving the Eurozone, a treaty amendment aimed at
facilitating such an exit seems out of the question for the time being.
B. Withdrawalfrom the European Union
Another way for a member state to leave the Eurozone is to leave
the European Union entirely. This option has the advantage that it is
legally uncontroversial. Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) explicitly provides that each member state has the right to
withdraw from the European Union. 147 Such a withdrawal would
automatically terminate the member state's membership in the
48
Eurozone as well. 1
Of course, even if a member state were willing to withdraw from
the Eurozone, it would hardly be ready to withdraw from the
European Union to achieve this aim. Membership in the European
Union is the key to accessing Europe's markets. Under the so-called
Fundamental Freedoms, firms from one member state can sell their
goods and services in other member states without having to worry
about customs duties or equivalent measures, workers are free to
take up employment in other states, citizens of one state are free to
establish companies in another state, and capital can be moved freely
from member state to member state. 149 If a member state were to
leave the European Union, its firms and citizens would lose these
rights. 150 Of course, some access to European markets may still be
granted via bilateral agreements. However, the outcome of bilateral
negotiations is difficult to predict. All this suggests that leaving the
European Union would be a recipe for economic disaster.
C. Withdrawalfrom the Eurozone
The question remains whether EU law allows a member state to
withdraw unilaterally from the Eurozone, while remaining in the
European Union. Neither the Treaty on European Union 151 nor the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 152 explicitly
mentions a right to withdraw from the Eurozone. However, scholars.
disagree about how to interpret this silence.

147.
148.

TEU, supra note 142, art. 50(1).
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 131; Smits, supra note 2, at

1139-40.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 131-32.
Id.
See TEU, supra note 142.
See TFEU, supra note 41.
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The traditional view has been that EU law does not permit such
a unilateral withdrawal. 153 However, in related work, I have argued
that this traditional view is mistaken. 154 A more persuasive
interpretation of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union is that any member state can withdraw from the Eurozone if it
no longer fulfills the preconditions for joining the Eurozone in the
first place. 155 This interpretation draws heavily on legal policy
arguments: sometimes, withdrawal from the Eurozone may be the
only way to stave off economic disaster, and alternative ways of
leaving the Eurozone, such as a treaty amendment or an exit from
the entire European Union, are typically impractical and, in the case
156
of a treaty amendment, subject to obvious hold-up problems.
Incidentally, this second view seems to be gaining traction in the
wake of the Greek crisis. 157 Of course, for the time being, the
practical importance of this question is limited, since the current
Greek government is adamantly opposed to leaving the Eurozone.

153.
See, e.g., DAVID HOWDEN, INSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RECESSION 128 (2010); MARIA LORCA-SUSINO, THE EURO IN THE
21ST CENTURY: ECONOMIC CRISIS AND FINANCIAL UPROAR 205 (2010); Athanassiou,
supra note 2; Hans Diekmann & Carsten Bernauer, Mdgliche Rechtsfolgen fir
Vertragliche Verhdltnisse bei einer Wdhrungsumstellung eines Mitgliedstaates der
Europdischen Wdhrungsunion [Possible Legal Implications for Contracts in Case of a
Change of Currency in a Member State of the European Monetary Union], 15 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFT GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZG] 1172, 1175 (2012); Herrmann, supra note 2,
at 417; Hannes Hofmeister, Goodbye Euro: Legal Aspects of Withdrawal from the
Eurozone, 18 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 111, 134 (2011); Werner Meng, Artikel 50 EUV.
Austritt aus der Europdischen Union [Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal from the European
Union], in VON DER GROEBEN/SCHWARZEJHATJE, EUROPAISCHES UNIONSRECHT (Jiirgen

Schwarze & Armin Hatje eds., 7th ed. 2015); Dirk Meyer, Rechtliche Mbglichkeiten
eines Ausscheidens aus dem Euro und die Rickiibertragungder Wdhrungssouverdnitdt
[Legal Options for Leaving the Euro and Reacquiring Monetary Sovereignty], 48
EUROPARECHT [EUR] 334, 347 (2013); Ingolf Pernice, Ringen um den Euro [Wrestling
with the Euro], 23 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIVI FUR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZWI 601,
602 (2012); Hal Scott, When the Euro Falls Apart A Sequel, 6 (Harvard Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-16, 2011);
Martin Seidel, Der Euro--Schutzschild oder Falle? [The Euro-Protective Shield or
Trap?] 26 (ZEI, Working Paper No. B01, 2010).
154.
See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 155.
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 150.
157.
See, e.g., id. at 155 (suggesting a unilateral right to withdraw from the
Eurozone);
Oliver
Dbrr, Art. 50 EUV.: Austritt aus der Union, in
GRABITZIHILF[NETTESHErM: DAS RECHT DER EUROPMISCHEN UNION
30 (Martin
Nettesheim ed., 56th ed. 2015) (suggesting that a withdrawal from the Eurozone might
be conceptualized as a partial withdrawal from the European Union, and thus based on
Article 50 of the TEU).
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IV. EXPULSION
This leaves the central question of this Article, namely whether
the European Union can expel a member state from the Eurozone
against its will. The legal literature generally denies such an
expulsion right. 158 This Part argues that this view is misguided.
It is true that those potential bases for such an expulsion right,
which receive the most attention in the literature, 159 notably the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the suspension clause
in Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, cannot serve this
purpose. However, the inquiry should not stop there. Rather, the
question remains whether the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union can be read to include an unwritten right to expel
misbehaving member states from the Eurozone; and this Part will
show that this question has to be answered in the affirmative. The
expulsion of member states should only be allowed as an ultima ratio,
but it should not be taken off the table entirely.
A. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Some scholars have raised the question of whether the Vienna
Convention on the law of Treaties 160 might not justify an exclusion
from the Eurozone. 16 1 However, the answer to that question has to be
no. The most promising basis for an expulsion right under the Vienna
16 2
Convention lies in the so-called clausula rebus sic stantibus.
According to this principle, codified in Article 62 of the Convention, a
fundamental change in the circumstances underlying a treaty may
sometimes justify the suspension or termination of the treaty. 163
However, any attempt to bring the clausula rebus sic stantibus
to bear on the question of Eurozone membership faces at least three
obstacles. 164 First, it is difficult to argue that the clausula rebus sic

158.
See supra note 2.
159.
See infra note 167.
160.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
Cf. Peter Behrens, Ist ein Ausschluss aus der Euro-Zone Ausgechlossen? [Is
161.
an Exclusion from the Eurozone Precluded?], 13 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [ZIW] 121, 121 (2010) (asking, though ultimately leaving open, the
question of whether a grave treaty violation might not justify an exclusion from the
Eurozone under the rules of the Vienna Convention); Horn, supra note 2, at 1403
(arguing that the Vienna Convention provides a right to expel member states from the
Eurozone where there has been a grave violation of EU law or a fundamental change of
circumstances).
162.
See, e.g., DELANO VERWEY, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE EUROPEAN
UNION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TREATIES 146 (2004).
163.
Vienna Convention, supra note 160, art. 62.
The following discussion draws heavily on Dammann, Right to Leave,
164.
supra note 31, at 133-37.
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stantibus is even applicable to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. 165 Second, even if that hurdle could somehow be
overcome, it is even less persuasive to claim that an economic crisis
like the one in Greece qualifies as a "fundamental change" within the
meaning of the Vienna Convention. 166 And third, it is not clear that
the clausula rebus sic stantibus even offers a remedy that is suitable
167
to the problem at hand.
1. Applicability
While not all member states have ratified the Vienna
Convention, 168 the clausula rebus sic stantibus is part of customary
international law and therefore binds even those states that have not
ratified the Vienna Convention. 169 Moreover, as far as international
treaties between the European Union and third countries (i.e.,
countries outside the European Union) are concerned, the Court of
Justice has made it clear that the European Union's institutions are
170
also bound by this doctrine.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the clausula rebus
sic stantibus can be applied to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. 171 This treaty, together with the Treaty on
European Union, forms the foundation of EU law. 172 As the Court of
Justice has made clear with respect to their predecessor, the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, these treaties are
fundamentally different from ordinary international treaties in that

165.
Id. at 134.
166.
Id. at 133.
167.
See infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
168.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 160.
169.
ATHANASSIOS VAMVOUKos, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 150-51 (1985); MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 780 (2009); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding
International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV. 65, 90 n.91
(2007); Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 133; Thomas Giegerich, Article 62:
Fundamental Change of Circumstances, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 1067, 1099-100 (Oliver Dorr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds., 2012)
[hereinafter Giegerich, Article 62]; Emily K. Penney, Comment, Is That Legal?: The
United States' Unilateral Withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 51 CATH.
U.L. REV. 1287, 1300 (2002); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2501, 2539 (2005).
170.
See Case C-162196, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998
E.C.R. 1-3655.
171.
See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 133.
172.
See, e.g., Stephen C. Sieberson, Inching Toward EU Supranationalism?
QualifiedMajority Voting and Unanimity Under the Treaty of Lisbon, 50 VA. J. INT'L L.
919, 921-22 n.3 (2010).
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they create their own legal system. 173 This is no mere technicality.
Rather, the Court of Justice has invoked this peculiar nature in order
to justify deviating from the ordinary rules of international law. One
example is the so-called primacy of EU law, that is, the principle that
national courts have to abstain from applying national law to the
extent that it conflicts with EU law. 174 Another example concerns the
interpretation of EU law. 175 Rather than applying the principles on
treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention, the Court
has developed its own, very distinct approach to interpreting the EU
treaties. 176 Accordingly, it is not clear why the clausula rebus sic
stantibus should be applicable to the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union when other aspects of the Vienna Convention are
not. 177

Furthermore, even if the special nature of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union is insufficient to bar the
application of the clausula rebus sic stantibus, the application of that
178
doctrine may still run afoul of individual provisions of the Treaty.
179
The clausula rebus sic stantibus is not mandatory in nature.
Rather, the parties to a treaty are at liberty to deviate from this
principle. 180 Accordingly, if one assumes that the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union contains an unwritten expulsion
remedy, then the parties to the Treaty have already addressed the
question of whether and when a member state can be expelled, albeit
in an implicit fashion. But even if one were to reject the existence of
such an unwritten expulsion remedy, one would still be precluded
from invoking the clausula rebus sic stantibus. After all, it must be
kept in mind that Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union
explicitly allows member states to leave the European Union, thereby
creating a safety valve for those member states who believe that their

173.
See Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energie Elettrica [ENEL], 1964
E.C.R. 593 (holding that "[bly contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC
Treaty has created its own legal system.").
174.
Id. at 593-94.
175.
See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134.
176.
Cf. Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretationat the European Court of Justice, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 656 (1997) (analyzing the interpretative approach of the Court of
Justice).
177.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134; cf. Thomas Giegerich,
Article 60, supra note 2, at 1042 (arguing that member states cannot be expelled from
the European Union because European law does not constitute international law
within the meaning of Article 60 of the Vienna Convention).
178.
See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134.
179.
E.g., VILLIGER, supra note 169.
180.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134; Giegerich, Article 62,
supra note 169, at 1099-103.
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duties under EU law have become too burdensome. Hence, there is no
18 1
room to apply the clausula rebus sic stantibus.
2. A Fundamental Change in Circumstances?
Even assuming, for the sake of the argument, that the doctrine
of rebus sic stantibus is applicable to the question of Eurozone
membership, the question remains whether an economic crisis like
the one unfolding in Greece qualifies as a fundamental change in
182
circumstances within the meaning of this doctrine.
As provided in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, the
threshold that such a change must exceed is rather high:
circumstances existing at the time of the Treaty's conclusion must
have changed in a fundamental way. 183 These circumstances must
have formed an essential basis for the parties' agreement; 184 and the
relevant change must have transformed the extent of the parties'
185
remaining obligations under the Treaty in a radical fashion.
Moreover, these requirements have to be interpreted narrowly, as the
86
doctrine of rebus sic stantibus only applies in rare cases.1
Can one make the case that an economic crisis like the one
holding Greece in its grip satisfies these requirements and therefore
allows other member states to invoke the clausula rebus sic
stantibus? This seems more than dubious. At most, one might try to
argue that, for the other Eurozone countries, the Greek crisis brought
the necessity to finance ever new rescue packages in order to prevent
a Greek insolvency and that the parties failed to foresee this
development. However, such a line of reasoning would be flawed for
various reasons. To begin with, application of the clausula rebus sic
stantibus requires that change in circumstances has made the
parties' existing obligations incurred under the treaty more
burdensome. 187 However, nothing in the Treaty on the Functioning of

See, e.g., Christian Calliess, EUV Art. 50, in EUV/AEUJV 468 (Christian
181.
Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 4th ed. 2011); Juliane Kokott & Matthias Pechstein,
Art. 53 EUV,in EUV/AEUV 324, 325 (Rudolf Streinz ed., 2d ed. 2012); Dammann,
Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134.
182.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 134-35.
183.
Vienna Convention, supra note 160, art. 62.
184.
Id.
Id.
185.
186.
See, e.g., Gabikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997
I.C.J. 7, 104 (Sept. 25); David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of
the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 552, 585 n.133 (1993); Harlan Grant Cohen,
"Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History, 84 TUL. L. REV. 957,
1003 n.263 (2010); Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 135; Paolo Di Rosa, The
Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties:
Background and PrincipalLegal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 41, 66 (2004);
Geoffrey R. Watson, The Death of Treaty, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 781, 822 (1994).
187.
See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 135.
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the European Union forces member states to participate in the
bailout. 188 In fact, the Treaty is particularly clear on this issue. It
even contains an explicit anti-bailout clause in Article 125, which
provides that "[a] member state shall not be liable for or assume the
commitments of ... another member state." 189 While this provision

does not stand in the way of voluntary bailouts, 190 it makes it very
clear that no member state is under any obligation to participate in
19 1
such bailouts.
And indeed, not all member states have participated to the same
extent in bailouts. For example, Finland participated in the 2012
bailout, but only after receiving collateral from Greece. 192 The United
Kingdom went even further and declined to participate in the first or
second Greek bailout on the grounds that it was not part of the
Eurozone, 193 though the United Kingdom still ended up having to
support Greece indirectly, since the United Kingdom is a member of
194
the IMF.
Any attempt to cast an economic crisis as a fundamental change
in circumstances also faces a second obstacle. By general consensus,
those changes that the parties anticipated do not justify the
application of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. 19 5 According to
some scholars, the application of that doctrine is barred even in those
cases, where the parties ought to have anticipated the relevant
change. 196 This hurdle proves crucial because it seems farfetched to
argue that the member states did not foresee-let alone that they
could not have foreseen-the occurrence of a profound economic crisis.
After all, why would the member states have included a provision
ordering that member states do not have to bail out other member
states ifthey had not correctly foreseen the possibility that some

Id.
188.
TFEU, supra note 41, art. 125.
189.
190.
Behrens, supra note 161, at 121; Franz C. Mayer & Christian Heidfeld,
Verfassungs-und Europarechtliche Aspekte der Einfiihrung von Eurobonds [The
Introduction of Eurobonds: Constitutional and EU Law Considerations], 65 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 422, 424 (2012).
191.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 135.
Derek Scally & Suzanne Lynch, Greek Drama 'A Parody, a Comedy and a
192.
Tragedy', IRISH TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.irishtimes.comlnews/worldleuropel
analysis-greek-drama-a -parody-a-comedy- and-a-tragedy- 1.2276891 [https://perma.cc/Q
BC8-P5TS] (archived Mar. 6, 2016).
193.
Adam Taylor, U.K. Refuses to Take Part in the Next Greek Bailout,
BUSINESS INSIDER (June 20, 2011, 8:09 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/greeceuk-bail-out-2011-6 [https://perma.cc/966K-HF8S] (archived Feb. 17, 2016).
194.
Id.
See, e.g., VAMVOUKOS, supra note 169, at 189; VILLIGER, supra note 169, at
195.
773, 15; Giegerich, Article 62, supra note 169, at 58.
Other authors insist that mere foreseeability does not prevent application
196.
of the doctrine. See, e.g., VAMVOUKOS, supra note 169, at 189; Giegerich, Article 62,
supra note 169, at 1087, 58.
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member states would need to be bailed out? Furthermore, all or
almost all developed economies at some point experience profound
economic crises, and at the time that Greece was admitted to the
Eurozone, it was hardly known as an economic powerhouse.
Accordingly, an economic crisis like the one in Greece hardly
constitutes a unforeseen fundamental change in circumstances as
19 7
required by the clausula rebus sic stantibus.
3. Consequences of a Fundamental Change in Circumstances
Finally, it is not even clear that the clausula rebus sic stantibus
offers an appropriate remedy. The parties invoking a fundamental
change in circumstances may be able to terminate, withdraw from, or
suspend the operation of the relevant treaty, 198 but it is widely
thought that they cannot unilaterally change that treaty against the
opposition of the other party or parties. 199 Therefore, it is unclear
how the clausula rebus sic stantibus should justify a member state's
expulsion from the Eurozone. After all, the provisions governing the
admission of new member states into the Eurozone form part of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 200 and no one
wishes to terminate, withdraw from, or suspend the operation of that
particular Treaty.
In sum, the clausula rebus sic stantibus simply does not offer a
plausible option for expelling Greece from the Eurozone.
B. Suspension Clause
Another conceivable basis for an expulsion right with greater
prima facie plausibility is the so-called suspension clause in Article 7
of the EU Treaty. Under said provision, the Council-which consists
of the representatives of the member states-may suspend certain
rights of a member state under the Treaties if that member state has
committed a persistent and serious breach of the values listed in
Article 2.201 Because Article 7 allows only the temporary suspension,
20 2
rather than the permanent elimination, of a member state's rights,
this provision could at most serve as a basis for a temporary exclusion
from the Eurozone. However, for practical purposes, that would be
sufficient; even in the case of Greece, those voices calling for an exit
from the Eurozone typically demand a temporary rather than a

197.
198.
1100, 99.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 135-36.
VILLIGER, supra note 169, at 778; Giegerich, Article 62, supra note 169, at
See Giegerich, Article 62, supra note 169, at 1099-100.
TFEU, supra note 41, art. 140.
TEU, supranote 142, art. 7.
Id. art. 7(3).
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permanent exit. 20 3 Moreover, Article 7 does not impose any specific
time limit on the suspension of rights.
Of course, the crucial question is whether Article 7 can be
brought to bear on the problem at hand. Any attempt to do so faces
two obstacles. First, the application of the suspension clause requires
that a member state has violated one of the European Union's
requirement that is rather difficult to
fundamental values 2 4 -a
meet. Second, it is unpersuasive to argue that a state's membership
in the Eurozone constitutes a right within the meaning of Article 7.
1. A Violation of Fundamental Values
The application of the suspension clause requires a persistent
and serious breach of the values listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on
European Union. 20 5 These values include respect for human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and human rights,
20 6
including the rights of persons belonging to minority groups.
Obviously, most of these values are in no way touched by the fact
that a member state undergoes a severe economic crisis. However, the
idea that a member state that constantly and persistently flouts the
rules governing the Eurozone shows insufficient respect for the rule
of law is not a priori implausible. Of course, various factors suggest
that the rule-of-law criterion in Article 7 has to be interpreted rather
narrowly. The parties' decision to demand a breach of fundamental
values in order for membership to be suspended would be completely
circumvented if any persistent and grave violation of EU law were
20 7
sufficient to justify a suspension of rights.
Furthermore, the need for a very high threshold is underscored
by the fact that the suspension clause is quite narrowly drawn with
high procedural safeguards. First of all, the Council, which is
composed of representatives of the member states at the ministerial
level, 20 8 has to determine with a four-fifths majority that there is a
clear risk of a serious breach of the values listed in Article 2.209
Subsequently, the Council has to verify at regular intervals if the
relevant breach persists. 2 10 If it does persist, the European Council-

See supra note 138.
203.
204.
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7(2).
205.
Id. art. 7.
206.
Id. art. 2.
207.
Cf. Frank Schorkopf, Art. 7 EUV: Verletzung Fundamentaler Grundsdtze
Durch Einen Mitgliedstaat, in GRABITZJHILFfNETTESHEIM: DAS RECHT DER
30 (Martin Nettesheim ed., 56th ed. 2015) (arguing that a
EUROPAISCHEN UNION
breach can only be deemed serious within the meaning of Article 7 of the TEU if it is so
grave as to call European integration in question).
TEU, supra note 142, art. 16(2).
208.
Id. art. 7(1).
209.
Id.
210.
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which is composed of the heads of state or government 2 11-may
determine the existence of a persistent and serious breach, but only
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. 2 12 Only if all
these steps have been undertaken may the Council decide to suspend
certain of the rights of the member state in question. 2 13 In making
that decision, the Council has to take into account any adverse
consequences that such a suspension might have for natural and legal
persons. 2 14 In sum, the suspension procedure is extremely restrictive.
If nothing else, this suggests that it represents a means of last resort,
to be used very sparingly. Ordinary violations of EU law, even if they
are grave and persistent, cannot therefore suffice to suspend a
member state's rights.
Against this backdrop, it is very difficult to argue that the mere
failure of a member state to adhere to the limits on budget deficits
and government debt set by the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union and the Stability and Growth Pact suffice to invoke
Article 7 of the Treaty European Union. Even before the euro crisis,
member states repeatedly and consciously violated the Stability and
Growth Pact without being held accountable at all. 215 This has been
2 16
true even for large member states such as France and Germany.
Surely, if these violations were not considered worthy of any
sanctions, then the more extensive, but also more understandable,
violations of the relevant provisions by a member state in the midst of
a profound economic crisis cannot justify the suspension of that
member state's rights either, given that the suspension clause is
clearly intended as a last resort.
Of course, none of this implies that a member state's violation of
the rules pertaining to the monetary union can never rise to the level
of a persistent and serious violation of the rule of law. In fact, one can
easily imagine scenarios where a member state's conduct represents a
vital threat to the functioning of the Eurozone. For example, a
member state might openly declare that it would permanently
disregard any rules pertaining to the Eurozone, as well as any fines

211.
Id. art. 15(2).
212.
Id. art. 7(2).
213.
Id. art. 7(3).
214.
Id.
215.
Michael J. Boskin, Five Lessons for Deficit Busters, WALL ST. J. (June 20,
2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303823104576391331356123692
[https://perma.cc/F7NX-ZWMC] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that, even before the
recession, the Stability and Growth Pact was routinely violated).
216.
Jonathan Blitzer, Spain as Our Punching Bag, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2012,
at SR3 (noting that Germany repeatedly violated the Stability and Growth Pact
between 2001 and 2007); Martin Feldstein, Europe Needs the Bond Vigilantes, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.nber.org/feldstein/wsj04042012.html [https://perma.cc/
FU2X-6P9J] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that both France and Germany violated
the Stability and Growth Pact).
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levied against it and any judgments by the Court of Justice.
Depending on the circumstances, such open defiance, if left
unpunished, might well threaten the survival of the Eurozone. The
Article will return to this problem in more detail below. 2 17 However,
it is worth noting that neither Greece nor any other member state has
yet come close to this type of misconduct.
2. Expulsion as a Suspension of Rights?
Even if a state's conduct represented a persistent and serious
breach of the rule of law, the question remains whether the
temporary expulsion from the Eurozone constitutes a suspension of
rights within the meaning of Article 7 of the TEU, or, to use the
wording of the Treaty, whether it can be viewed as a suspension of
"certain of the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to
218
the member state in question."
The problem, in this context, is that the Treaty clearly
distinguishes between a member state's rights on the one hand and
its duties on the other. As an example of a right that can be
suspended, it lists "the voting rights of the representative of the
government of that Member State in the Council. ' 2 19 At the same
time, the Treaty specifies that "[t]he obligations of the Member State
in question under the Treaties shall in any case continue to be
binding on that State." 2 20 In other words, Article 7 can only be used
to suspend rights and cannot form a basis for suspending duties. This
matters in the context at hand because participation in the Eurozone
is not just a right but also a duty: in the absence of an exemption, like
the one negotiated by the United Kingdom, 22 1 the question of
whether to join the Eurozone is not left to the member states'
discretion. Rather, they are obligated to do so once they satisfy the
relevant preconditions. 22 2 It follows that an expulsion from the
Eurozone-even if it is only temporary-cannot be based on Article 7
of the TEU.
C. The Case for an Unwritten Expulsion Remedy
The question remains whether there exists an unwritten right to
expel individual member states from the Eurozone. In the legal
223
literature, the general answer to this question has been "no."

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See infra Part IV(2)(b).
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7(3).
Id.
Id.
See Protocol (No. 15), supra note 144.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 138.
See supra note 2.
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Typically, scholars simply point to the fact that the Treaty on the

Functioning of the European Union does not mention any right to
expel misbehaving member states.

2 24

However, invoking the silence of the Treaty is unpersuasive.
Unwritten legal principles are quite common in EU law. Indeed, the
Court of Justice developed some of the most important legal doctrines
with little or no textual basis in the Treaty. For example, the
mandatory requirements doctrine, which allows member states to
limit the fundamental freedoms for the sake of overriding

requirements in the public interest, 22 5 falls into this category, 226 and
so do the rules on the liability of member states for violating EU
law. 22 7 Indeed, even the primacy of EU law-the principle that
national courts cannot apply national law that is incompatible with

EU law2 28 -had no basis in the text of the Treaty. This tendency of
the Court of Justice to develop unwritten legal doctrines when
necessary

reflects the

fact that purposive

crucial rule in interpreting EU law.

22 9

considerations

play

a

In particular, the Court of

Justice has made it clear that it is ready to go beyond the wording of

224.
E.g., Hide, Artikel 140, supra note 2; Hdde, Europiischer Solidaritit,
supra note 2, at 865; Herrmann, supra note 2, at 417.
225.
See, e.g., Case C-196/89, Nespoli & Crippa, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3647, T 14; Case
6/81, BV Industrie Diensten Groep v. J.A. Beele Handelmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R.
707, T 7; Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837,
6; Jens C.
Dammann, Note, The Future of CodeterminationAfter Centros: Will German Corporate
Law Move Closer to the U.S. Model?, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 607, 647 (2003).
226.
E.g., Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme:
Comparing the Concept of "Necessity" in InternationalInvestment Law and WTO Law,
14 CHI. J. INT'L L. 93, 98 (2013) (noting that the mandatory requirements doctrine
allows member states to limit the free movement of goods based on "grounds of
justification... that do not have a basis in the treaty text").
227.
Cf. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 311-36 (3d ed. 2013)
(summarizing the relevant case law).
228.
See infra text accompanying notes 313-19.
229.
See, e.g., Case C-173/06, Agrover Srl v. Agenzia Dogane Circoscrizione
Doganale di Genova, 2007 E.C.R. 1-8783
21-22 (giving "the purpose and general
scheme" of a provision more weight than its wording); Carlos A. Ball, The Making of a
TransnationalCapitalist Society: The Court of Justice, Social Policy, and Individual
Rights Under the European Community's Legal Order, 37 HARv. INT'L L.J. 307, 334
(1996) (noting that the Court of Justice employs a "teleological or instrumental
approach" when interpreting rights and freedoms granted by the Treaty); Dammann,
Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 137 (noting the "paramount importance" of
teleological considerations in interpreting EU law); Fennelly, supra note 176, at 664
(pointing out that a teleological approach to legal interpretation is "the characteristic
element in the Court's interpretive method"); Constantinos N. Kakouris, Use of the
Comparative Method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 6 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 267, 273 (1994) (noting that the Court "constantly uses teleological
interpretation"); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative
Character of Supranationalism:The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM.
L. REV. 628, 701 (1999) (noting that 'the teleological method' ... has.., dominated the
reasoning of the European Court of Justice since the early 1960s.").
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the Treaty to secure the "full effectiveness" or "effet utile" of EU
23 0
law.
Thus, the question of whether there exists an unwritten right to
expel member states from the Eurozone really boils down to two other
questions. First, are there persuasive doctrinal or other reasons not to
recognize such a right? And second, if there are not, are there
important policy reasons to recognize a right to expel member states
from the Eurozone?
1. Doctrinal Concerns
Given the literature's unanimous rejection of an unwritten
expulsion right, one would expect there to be compelling doctrinal
arguments against the existence of such a right. However, while the
number of arguments adduced against an expulsion right is
substantial, none of them are particularly convincing.
a. Complexity
To begin with, opponents of an expulsion right point to the legal
23 1
complexities that an expulsion from the Eurozone would entail.
However, it must be kept in mind that the Treaty on European Union
23 2
even provides for a withdrawal from the European Union itself,
which would have much more far-reaching consequences and lead to
much greater legal complexities than a mere exit from the Eurozone.
Accordingly, it is not clear why the legal complexities caused by a
member state's expulsion from the Eurozone should be
insurmountable. Moreover, an obvious answer to concerns about legal
complexities and other undesirable consequences of expulsion is for
the Court of Justice to introduce a balancing test. The use of such a
test would allow an expulsion only if the damage done to the
Eurozone by letting a country remain a member clearly outweighed

Thus, the Court of Justice has invoked the need to secure the practical
230.
effectiveness of EU law in order to justify the development of a number of important
doctrines with little or no basis in the text of the foundational treaties. See, e.g., Case
C-109/09, Deutsche Lufthansa AG v. Kumpan, 2011 E.C.R. 1-01309, 1 53 (holding that
national courts are required to interpret national law in accordance with EU law, and
justifying this principle by invoking the need "to ensure the full effectiveness of EU
law"); Joined Cases C-6 & C-9/90, Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, 1991
E.C.R. 1-5357, 33 (justifying the doctrine of state liability for violations of EU law by
the need to ensure the "full effectiveness of Community rules"); Case 148/78, Pubblico
21 (holding, despite the clear wording of the
Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629,
Treaty to the contrary, that directives sometimes have direct vertical effect, and
justifying this holding by stressing the need to preserve the "effectiveness" of
directives).
Athanassiou, supranote 2, at 33 (arguing that "forcing a Member State out
231.
of the EU or EMU would inevitably give rise to tremendous legal complexities").
TEU, supra note 142, art. 50.
232.
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concerns about the negative consequences of an expulsion. In any
case, the legal complexities resulting from an expulsion are hardly
likely to be overwhelming. Historically, partial or complete
dissolutions of currency unions have been a fairly common
phenomenon. 2 33 And, ever since the beginning of the Greek crisis,
much thinking has gone into the question of how to organize the exit
of a member state in an optimal fashion. 2 34 Indeed, the President of
the European Commission, Claude Juncker, himself noted that the
Commission had developed "detailed plans" to cope with a Greek exit
from the Eurozone. 2 35 In sum, there is no reason to consider the legal
complexities inherent in an expulsion from the Eurozone to be
unmanageable.
b. The Irrevocable Fixing of Exchange Rates
Those scholars who reject an expulsion remedy also invoke the
wording of Article 140 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. 2 36 This provision governs the procedure for
admitting member states into the Eurozone. According to 140(3) of
the TFEU, when a member state joins the Eurozone, the Council
shall "irrevocably fix the rate at which the euro shall be substituted
for the currency of the member state concerned .
"...-237
An almost
identical choice of words can be found in two of the protocols annexed
23 8
to the Treaty.
Some scholars argue that the term "irrevocably" implies that a
member state cannot ever leave the Eurozone. 2 39 However, this

233.
Cf. Volker Nitsch, Have a Break, Have a ...National Currency: When Do
Monetary Unions Fall Apart? 24-26 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1113, 2004),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=496002
[https://perma.cc/57JLRGU5] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (listing 245 country pairs with a shared currency
between 1948 through 1997, of which 128 currency pairs have been dissolved).
234.
Cf. ROGER BOOTLE ET AL., LEAVING THE EURO: A PRACTIcAL GUIDE (2011)
(detailing how the consequences of an exit from the Eurozone could be handled).
235.
Matthew Campbell & Bojan Pancevski, When No Means Yes, SUNDAY
TIMES (July 11, 2015), http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/focus/article158033
3.ece?CMP=OTH-gnws-standard-2015 07 11 [https://perma.cc/K5WA-XN8S] (archived
Mar. 6, 2016); Griff Witte & Michael Birnbaum, Europe Gives Greece 5 Days to Avoid
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.comlworld/withgreeces-fate-on-the-line-european-leaders-to-gather-for-critical-summit/2015/07/07/ca99
ab8a-242d-1le5-b621-b55e495e9b78_story.html [http://perma.cc/PQ5R-VVU6] (archived
Mar. 6, 2016).
236.
See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 2, at 13-14.
237.
TFEU, supra note 41, art. 140(3).
238.
Protocol (No. 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and of the European Central Bank, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 230, art. 46(3), ("The General
Council shall contribute to the necessary preparations for irrevocably fixing the
exchange rates."); id. art. 49 ("Following the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates...").
239.
See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 2, at 13-14; Hofmeister, supra note 153,
at 121.
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reasoning is not difficult to refute. 2 40 Even a literal reading of the
of the term
two
possible interpretations
text
suggests
24 1
First, one can read it to imply that exchange rates
"irrevocably."
are to be fixed for all eternity, meaning that no state can ever leave,
or be expelled from, the Eurozone. 242 Second, though, it can be read
to imply that while a state is a member of the Eurozone, the exchange
rate applied in introducing the euro cannot be modified. 243 On that
reading, the relevant passage contains no statement about whether or
not a member state can leave, or be expelled from, the Eurozone.
Crucially, there are two compelling reasons to think that this
second interpretation is the correct one. 244 To begin, the claim that
no state can ever leave the Eurozone is obviously false, since a
withdrawal from the European Union under Article 50 of the TEU
also entails an exit from the Eurozone. 245 And second, Article 140(3)
of the TFEU and the relevant provisions in Protocol 4 must be
understood in light of the history of the monetary union. 2 46 As
previously described, the Eurozone was preceded by the so-called
Exchange Rate Mechanism, which generally fixed exchange rates but
allowed them to fluctuate within certain margins. 24 7 One of the
limitations of the Mechanism was that the prescribed exchange rates
had to be modified ("realigned") periodically. 248 Article 140(3) and the
pertinent parts of Protocol 5 simply make clear that the currency
exchange rates underlying the introduction of the euro shall not be
subject to any such realignment. This becomes evident if one
considers the wording of the relevant passages. If the Treaties had
intended to characterize the introduction of the euro as irrevocable,
then they could have said so very easily. Focusing instead on the
exchange rates only makes sense if the exchange rates underlying the
introduction of the euro are what the Treaty is really concerned with.
c. The Irreversible Move to the Third State of the Monetary Union
Opponents of an expulsion right also invoke the so-called
Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of the Economic and
Monetary Union. 24 9 That protocol emphasizes the "irreversible

240.
This section draws heavily on Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at
140-41.
Id. at 140.
241.
Id.
242.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
248.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
249.
Protocol on the Transition to the Third Stage of the Economic and
Monetary Union, 1992 O.J. 191/87 (C) [hereinafter Transition Protocol].

730

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 49:693

character of the Community's movement to the third stage of
250
Economic and Monetary Union."
As in the interpretations of Article 140 (3) of the TFEU
mentioned above, some scholars have argued that the term
"irreversible" here implies that a country's membership in the
Eurozone cannot be terminated. 2 5 1 And this line of reasoning is again
easily refuted. 2 52 One naturally wants once more to advert to the fact
that Article 50 of the TEU explicitly allows member states to
withdraw from the European Union and thereby from the
Eurozone. 253 Even more importantly, the quoted passage does not
even deal with the question of whether a member state has to remain
part of the Eurozone. Even a literal reading suggests that only the
creation of the Eurozone is declared to be irreversible; the question of
which member states will be part of that Eurozone is not even
touched upon. 25 4 Indeed, this interpretation is confirmed if one
considers the next sentence of the Protocol, 255 which reads:
Therefore all member states shall, whether they fulfill the necessary conditions
for the adoption of a single currency or not, respect the will for the Community
to enter swiftly into the third stage, and
therefore no member state shall
2 56
prevent the entering into the third stage.

This passage is a frank declaration that the Eurozone shall come
about, regardless of whether or not all states are able to join it. The
intention behind this declaration is clear: the creation of the
Eurozone shall not be held up by laggards. 257 Politically, this point is
of tremendous importance because it embraces, on a small scale, the
creation of a two-speed Europe in which some member states are
further along than others.2 58 Hence, this passage has nothing to do
with the question of whether member states can leave the Eurozone.
If anything, the relevant protocol supports the idea of an expulsion
right because it reinforces the idea that the existence of the Eurozone
cannot be abandoned simply because of the inability or unwillingness
of individual countries to satisfy the convergence criteria.

250.
251.
252.
140-42.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
See, e.g., Hofmeister, supra note 153, at 121.
This section draws heavily on Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at
Id. at 141-42.
Id.
Id.
Transition Protocol, supra note 249.
Dammann, Right to Leave, supra note 31, at 142-43.
Id. at 143.
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d. Penalizing Citizens
It has also been suggested that the expulsion of a member state
would penalize ordinary citizens. 259 However, that argument is
unpersuasive. Ignoring the burden inflicted on ordinary citizens may
indeed seem problematic, but the expulsion remedy can easily be
designed in such a way as to attach proper weight to the interests of
ordinary citizens. In particular, nothing prevents the Court of Justice
from making the unwritten right of expulsion contingent on a
balancing test under which the benefits of an expulsion must clearly
outweigh the harm it does, thereby allowing the Court to take into
account the burden that an expulsion imposes on ordinary citizens.
In fact, this solution would be similar to the approach taken by
the Treaty on European Union law itself, in the context of the
suspension clause. 260 It is not difficult to see that any suspension of a
member state's rights under Article 7 may ultimately harm that
state's citizens. For example, the Treaty on European Union explicitly
contemplates the suspension of a member state's voting rights in the
Council. 26 1 Obviously, the state's citizens ultimately suffer the
consequences of such a suspension of voting rights because they lose
their (indirect) voice in the Council. Yet the Treaty only requires that
such adverse consequences be taken into account when deciding
262
whether or not to suspend a member state's rights.
There are furthermore other areas of EU law where a member
state's misconduct leaves its citizens to bear the consequences. For
example, if a member state enacts legislation violating the
fundamental freedoms, that legislation cannot be applied to cases
governed by the fundamental freedoms, but can still be applied in
those cases where the fundamental freedoms do not apply, namely in
so-called purely internal situations that lack a cross-border
dimension. 26 3 In practice, this has given rise to what scholars call
"reverse discrimination" in European law: 2 64 burdensome rules

See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 2, at 33.
259.
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7.
260.
Id. art. 7(3) (listing the suspension of voting rights in the Council as one
261.
example).
Id. art. 7(3) (noting that, in deciding whether or not to suspend a member
262.
state's rights, "the Council shall take into account the possible consequences of such a
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons.").
263.
See Joined Cases C-64 & C-65/96, Uecker & Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein16; Case C-206/91, Poirrez v Caisse d'Allocations
Westfalen, 1997 E.C.R. 1-3171,
11; Piet Eeckhout, The Growing Influence of
Familiales [CAF], 1992 E.C.R. 1-6685,
European Union Law, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1490, 1495-96 (2010); Koen Lenaerts,
Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice, 33

FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1338, 1349 (2010); Ruth Mason, Flunking the ECJ's Tax
DiscriminationTest, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72, 129 (2007).

See, e.g., Dimitry Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European
264.
Citizenship and the Difficult Relationship Between Status and Rights, 15 COLUM. J.
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adopted by a member state may end up applying to a state's own
citizens but not to the citizens of other states, because the latter are
protected by the fundamental freedoms whereas the former are not.
Hence, a member state's infringement of EU law ends up penalizing
its own citizens by putting them at a competitive disadvantage vis-Avis foreign citizens. Incidentally, it is not particularly surprising that
EU law should impose a burden on the citizens of a state that violates
EU law. After all, such burdens provide voters with a powerful
incentive not to elect governments who will violate EU law in the first
place. And for the same reason, the fact that a member state's
expulsion from the Eurozone threatens to impose a burden on that
state's citizens is not entirely undesirable. If nothing else, it may
deter that state's voters from electing politicians who will get their
member state expelled from the Eurozone.
In sum, the fact that a member state's expulsion from the
Eurozone would end up imposing a burden on that member state's
citizens is hardly a strong argument against an expulsion right.
e. The Existence of an Exhaustive Regime of Sanctions
Scholars have also argued that there can be no room for the
expulsion of member states from the Eurozone since the Treaty's
regime of sanctions is already exhaustive. 26 5 Now, it is certainly
correct that the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union contain provisions that allow for
sanctions against a member state that does not comply with the rules
governing the Eurozone. To begin, if the violation rises to the level of
a persistent and grave breach of the fundamental values listed in
Article 2 of the TEU, the member state risks a suspension of its rights
under Article 7 of the TEU. 2 6 6 Furthermore, any member state
breaching EU law may face an infringement proceeding under
Articles 258, 259 of the TFEU. 2 67 However, the mere existence of
these sanctions does not imply that they are meant to be exhaustive;
in fact, there are compelling reasons to believe that they are not.
To begin with, it is noteworthy that the Court of Justice
developed the doctrine of state liability for breaches of EU law by
pointing out that existing remedies are insufficient to protect
individual rights. 268 This line of reasoning-and indeed the very
EUR. L. 169, 212 (2009); Lenaerts, supra note 263, at 1341. See generally Miguel
Poiares Maduro, The Scope of European Remedies: The Case of Purely Internal
Situations and Reverse Discrimination,in THE FUTURE OF REMEDIES IN EUROPE 11740 (Kilpatrick et al. eds., 2000).
265.
See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 2, at 33.
266.
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7(3).
267.
TFEU, supra note 41, arts. 258, 259.
268.
See Francovich & Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357,
33
(pointing out that "[tihe full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and
the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were
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creation of the doctrine of state liability-is incompatible with the
assertion that states breaching EU law do not have to fear any
adverse consequences besides those explicitly listed in the Treaties.
Most importantly, though, it is easy to see that the sanctions
provided in the Treaties are simply not always sufficient to provide
for the enforcement of EU law. Infringement proceedings and fines
are useless if a country is already bent on ignoring any fines and any
judgment by the Court of Justice: the European Commission, unlike
the government of the United States, 26 9 does not have the option to
send in federal troops. And Article 7 of the TEU is so narrowly drawn
that its efficacy as a deterrent is dubious at best. For example, Article
7 allows the suspension of voting rights, 2 70 but that may not impress
a country that has already lost its political influence in the Council.
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the sanctions explicitly
listed in the Treaties are meant to be exhaustive.
f. The Rules on Treaty Amendments
Finally, scholars have argued that the expulsion of a member
state from the Eurozone would amount to an amendment of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and any
amendment to the Treaty requires the consent of all member states,
including the one to be expelled. 27 1 However, it remains unclear why
the expulsion of a member state should be viewed as a treaty
amendment in the first place. Of course, such an expulsion impacts
the rights and duties of a member state under the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, but so does the withdrawal of a
member state from the European Union, and the Treaty does not
categorize such withdrawal as a treaty amendment either.
In sum, of the numerous doctrinal arguments that have been or
could be advanced against an unwritten expulsion right, none is
particularly convincing. Some of these arguments, such as one based
on the Treaty's clear commitment to the irreversible creation of a
Eurozone or on an analysis of other potential sanctions, can even be
adduced as arguments in favor of an expulsion right rather than
against it. It follows that doctrinal arguments do not provide a clear
answer to the question of whether there exists a right to expel
members from the Eurozone. As a result, the focus must be on legal

unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law
for which a Member State can be held responsible.").
For example, in 1957, President Eisenhower famously sent federal troops
269.
to Little Rock to enforce a federal desegregation court order. Mary L. Dudziak, Little
Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Image of American
Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1646 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 28 (1994).
270.
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7(3).
See, e.g., Athanassiou, supra note 2, at 33.
271.
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policy considerations. In other words, the question is whether there
are compelling policy reasons to assume an unwritten expulsion
remedy. That is the question that this Article will turn to next.
2. Expulsion as a Matter of Legal Policy
While at least some legal scholars have addressed, however
briefly, the question of whether, as a matter of black letter law, there
exists a right to expel misbehaving member states from the Eurozone,
the legal literature is strangely silent on whether such an expulsion
remedy is desirable as a matter of legal policy.272 The economic
literature also fails to address the desirability of an expulsion
remedy, though for a different reason. Unlike legal scholars,
economists have not been shy to express views about the policy
2 73
question of whether or not Greece ought to leave the Eurozone.
However, they studiously avoid the second-order question of who
should be in charge of making that decision, Greece or the remaining
2 74
Eurozone countries.
Of course, that has not stopped politicians from adopting definite
positions on this question. As early as 2012, Angela Merkel voiced her
opinion that member states who do not play by the Eurozone's rules
ought to be subject to expulsion. 275 Others, including the President of
2 76
the European Commission, were quick to contradict her.
In fact, there is a distinction to be drawn here. There are
compelling reasons not to allow for the expulsion of a member state
simply because that member state finds itself caught in an economic
crisis and temporarily breaks the legal rules governing the Eurozone
in response. However, one can also imagine much more drastic
scenarios in which an expulsion from the Eurozone is in fact justified.
Those may include the case where a member state has decided,
without good cause, to permanently ignore the rules of the Eurozone
and to disregard any judgments by the Court of Justice seeking to
uphold EU law. Therefore, the remedy of expulsion should not be
precluded in all cases.
a. The Standard Case
It is helpful to begin with the scenario in which a member state
such as Greece finds itself in a deep economic crisis and therefore
opts to disregard the economic strictures of the Eurozone. In this

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra note 2.
See supra note 2.
See supranote 2.
McGroarty & Karnitschnig, supra note 4.
Barroso, supra note 1.
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case, an expulsion remedy is neither necessary nor even suitable to
protect any legitimate interests.
i. Protecting the Interests of the Expelled Member State
What interests might be at stake in such a scenario? One might
first try to justify an expulsion on the ground that an exit from the
Eurozone is in the best interest of the country to be expelled, even if
the government of that country fails to understand that. In other
words, one might try to justify an expulsion on paternalistic grounds,
an approach that enjoys some popularity among European
pundits. 277 However, the weaknesses of this type of reasoning ought
to be obvious. One can disagree about whether an exit from the
Eurozone is in a country's best interest; 2 78 but it is difficult to argue
that other member states are in a better position to answer that
question than the citizens of the member state whose participation in
the Eurozone is at stake. The best interest of a country ultimately
depends on that country's preferences and, on that score, that
country's own government is best placed to decide.
The case of Greece perfectly illustrates this point. While its
government has frequently been accused of disorganization and
inexperience, 279 there is little question that its preferences on both
Eurozone membership and austerity policies are in line with the

See, e.g., Dorothea Siems, Griechenland zu Tode Retten [Saving Greece to
277.
Death], DIE WELT (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.welt.de/print/welt-kompakt/debatte/
[https://perma.cc/29VW-WF82
article 145363070/Griechenland-zu-Tode-retten.html
(archived Mar. 6, 2016) (criticizing the 2015 bailout and arguing, inter alia, that a
Greek exit from the Eurozone combined with a sovereign default would benefit Greece);
Joachim Jahn, Kritiker Warnen vor Viertem und Finftem Rettungspaket [Critics Warn
against a Fourth and a Fifth Rescue Package], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
[FAZ], Aug. 19, 2015 (reporting that German opponents of the 2015 bailout defended
their position by claiming that a Greek exit from the Eurozone was not only in the best
interest of the Eurozone, but also in Greece's best interest).
See supra note 11.
278.
279.
See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Soften the Greek Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/07/opinion/roger-cohen-soften-the-greek-deal.html
[https://perma.ec/X2F3-XN93] (archived Feb. 17, 2016); Suzanne Daley & Anemona
Hartocollis, In Athens, Greeks Wonder Whether Tsipras Folded or Restored Greek
Dignity, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/11/world/europe/
in-athens-greeks-muse-on-tsiprass-abrupt-reversal.html?_r=0 [https://perma.ceM5AX6KSP] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that opposition parties were criticizing the
Greek prime minister as naive); Nektaria Stamouli & Marcus Walker, How Alexis
Tsiprass Greek Referendum Call Came After Creditors Covered His Proposals in Red
Ink, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2015, 7:26 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/first-red-ink[https://perma.cc/WX6B-PSN6]
then-tsiprass-call-for-greek-referendum- 1435524517
(archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that insiders are calling the Greek premier
"inexperienced"); Marcus Walker & Viktoria Dendrinou, Greece and Creditors Struggle
for Elusive Deal, WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2015, 2:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
greece-and-creditors-scramble-for-elusive-deal- 1432319404 [https://perma.cc/QX9R-U4
PT] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (citing officials from both Greece and the EU as claiming
the Greek government is "inexperienced" and "lacks enough technical experts").
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preferences of Greece's citizens. Polls show that an overwhelming
majority of Greeks want Greece to stay part of the Eurozone, 280 and
the 2015 referendum has also made it clear that Greek voters are fed
up with austerity policies. 2 81 By contrast, other member states'
governments are likely to decide based on their own citizens'
interests, and there is no reason to believe that those will coincide
with the interests of Greece's citizens.
In other words, the fact that an exit from the Eurozone may be
desirable only implies the need for a withdrawal right. By contrast, it
cannot be adduced as an argument for the expulsion remedy.
ii. Protecting the Interests of the European Union or of Other
Member States
A question remains concerning whether an expulsion remedy
might still be legally desirable because of its necessity for protecting
the legitimate interests of other member states or of the European
Union as a whole. But what interests might those be?
(a). Future Bailouts
Many commentators have expressed concern that Greece's
continued membership in the Eurozone will create the need for
repeated bailouts in the future, thereby transforming the Eurozone
into a "transfer union" where economically stronger states are forced
28 2
to support weaker ones.
However, this argument proves exceedingly tenuous. If an
economically troubled member state such as Greece fails to obey by
the legal strictures of the Eurozone, there are two possible outcomes.
To begin, the member state's economy may recover to a point where
the member state no longer requires help, in which case no further
bailouts are necessary. Alternatively, the member state may continue

280.
See Anton Troianovski, Germany's Angela Merkel Takes Firm Stance on
Greek Bailout, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2015, 12:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB11064341213388534269604581077610729539224
[https://perma.ccP5L2-GKC3]
(archived Mar. 6, 2016) (noting that "opinion polls show Greeks overwhelmingly want
to stay in the Eurozone.").
281.
See Kitsantonis & Kanter, supra note 114 (noting that the no vote
amounted to a "resounding rejection of proposed austerity measures").
282.
See, e.g., Jan Dams, Die Transferunion ist Ldngst Realitdt [The Transfer
Union Has Already Become Reality], DIE WELT (Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.welt.de/
wirtschaft/article145231112/Die-Transferunion-ist-Realitaet.html [https://perma.cc/UL
Z5-DQXP] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (arguing that the 2015 bailout has turned the
Eurozone into a transfer union, which Germans never wanted); Jtirgen Jeske, Wer Ist
ein Gutter Europder [Who Is a Good European?], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
(Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/eurokrise/griechenland/griechen
land-krise-wer-ist-ein-guter-europaeer-13745287.html
[https://perma.cc/PK98-XF6K]
(archived Mar. 6, 2016) (warning of a transfer union and calling Greece a bottomless
barrel); Siems, supra note 277, at 3 (warning that the 2015 bailout will turn the
Eurozone into a transfer union and that this development will ultimately threaten the
solvency of the entire Eurozone).
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to find itself in dire economic straits, thereby raising the issue of
additional bailouts. But in this second case, the .European Union's
institutions, as well as the other member states, always have the
option of refusing further help. Under EU law, economically troubled
member states have no legal right to be bailed out. 2 8 3 Of course, one
may fear that countries such as Germany and France will find it
politically difficult to refuse calls for further bailouts. However, that
does not justify calls for an expulsion remedy. First, it hardly seems
justified to impose the potentially devastating effects of an expulsion
on the population of an economically troubled member state simply
because other EU member states find it awkward to refuse further
help. Even more importantly, if the other member states cannot
muster the political will to refuse a bailout, how would one expect
them to exercise an expulsion right?
At this point, a caveat is in order. One may of course argue that
EU institutions and other Eurozone member states feel compelled to
undertake further bailouts for fear that the troubled member state's
economic or financial crisis will spread to other countries. But the
decisive question is whether the risk of such chain effects-and hence
the need for bailouts to prevent them-really depends on whether the
economically troubled member state is still part of the Eurozone. The
Article will turn to this question next.
(b). Economic Chain Reactions
Political commentators frequently express concerns that, if
Greece remains in the Eurozone, its descent into financial chaos and
284
insolvency will eventually drag other member states down too.
And, in fact, there is no question that a financial or economic crisis in
one member state may spread to other countries. However, the
crucial question is whether the expulsion of a member state can
prevent such a chain reaction. There is little reason to think that it
2 85
can.

See TFEU, supra note 41, art. 125.
283.
See, e.g., Daniel Eckert, Euro Schiittelt Griechen-Traumaab [Euro Shrugs
284.
Off Greek Trauma], DIE WELT (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.welt.de/print/die-welt/
finanzen/article 137566856/Euro- schuettelt-Griechen -Trauma-ab.html [https://perma.cc/
V7XT-M6XX] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (citing observers who believe that the Eurozone
would be more stable without Greece); Horn, supra note 2, at 1403 (stressing the
danger that more and more states will require bailouts and that the entire system may
collapse as a result); Volker Mester, Die Euro-Krise; Was Passiert, wenn Griechenland
Pleitegeht? [The Euro Crisis: What Happens When Greece Becomes Insolvent?],
HAMBURGER ABENDBLATT (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.abendblatt.de/wirtschaft/article
[https://perma.cc/5VCP108105579/Was-passiert-wenn-Griechenland-pleitegeht.html
XGJR] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (citing a German economist claiming that the Eurozone
could achieve greater stability in the long term without Greece).
285.
It is worth noting that economists tend to worry about the opposite
scenario; they fear that the (voluntary or involuntary) exit of a member state from the
Eurozone might spook the markets and set off a chain reaction leading to the financial
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A scenario in which the insolvency of, one Eurozone country
draws other member states into the abyss might arise for two main
reasons. First, the markets, having previously assumed that the
European Union would not allow Eurozone countries to become
insolvent, might come to view other member states as at risk once
this expectation has been proven wrong. 2 86 For example, let us
assume that the European Union allows Greece to become insolvent.
In that case, investors who previously believed that the European
Union would protect Eurozone countries from defaulting on their
sovereign debt might suddenly realize that their assumption was
mistaken and might therefore start to fear that the same fate might
befall other member states such as Spain or Italy. As a result, Spain
and Italy might suddenly find themselves at risk of financial collapse
as investors frantically try to sell off Spanish and Italian bonds.
Against that background, one might try to argue that Eurozone
countries that do not play by the rules should be expelled long before
they are actually in danger of becoming insolvent. That way, one can
reduce the risk that a Eurozone country goes insolvent and thereby
prevent the chain reaction described above.
However, upon closer examination, this line of reasoning is
rather tenuous. If markets ever assumed that Eurozone countries
could not become insolvent, 28 7 that expectation has long since
evaporated. Tellingly, when Greece's citizens voted "no" in their 2015
referendum and Greece became the first developed country to miss
interest payments to the IMF, the markets remained entirely
calm. 288 This suggests that many investors already expected Greece
to become insolvent, notwithstanding its membership in the
Eurozone.
Moreover, even assuming that markets still believe that
Eurozone membership reduces the risk of insolvency by making
collapse of other member states as well. See, e.g., Gillian Tett, US Fears a European
Sequel to Lehman Brothers, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/
s/0/4b200lca-e999-1 le4-a687-00144feab7de.html#axzz3jfr4kOG3 [https://perma.cc/2SQ
T-T5T5] (archived Mar. 21, 2016).
286.
This type of contagion has an analogue in the context of private firms
which is sometimes referred to as "informational contagion." See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin,
In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO L.J. 435, 458 (2011) (noting that "[i]nformational
contagion occurs when the failure of one firm results in market confidence eroding in
similar firms, which then fail when they are no longer able to obtain financing or
conduct transactions on viable terms."); David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 677, 718 (2012) (defining "informational contagion" as "a negative shock
that stems from information that one entity's troubles convey about other similar
entities").
287.
It has been speculated that at least in the past, markets assumed that
economically troubled Eurozone countries would be bailed out and thereby protected
from insolvency. See, e.g, Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, InternationalLaw and the
Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation,86 S. CAL. L. REV. 1025, 1061 (2013) (considering
such an assumption "possible").
288.
Sinn, supra note 10 (noting the markets' calm reaction to the no vote in the
referendum).
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bailouts more likely, subjecting economically troubled states to an
expulsion remedy would likely prove counterproductive. If
economically troubled member states become subject to expulsion,
then rational investors will understand that being in the Eurozone no
longer offers meaningful protection against insolvency.
A second mode of transmission for a financial crisis lies in crossborder financial contagion, particularly in the financial sector. 289 If,
for example, Spanish banks are heavily invested in Greek
government debt, then Greece's inability to repay its government may
also put the solvency of Spanish banks at risk. 290 Moreover, as the
financial crisis in the United States demonstrated, mere uncertainty
about the extent of exposure may be a big part of the problem. 29 1 For
example, if Spanish banks actually hold a very limited stake in Greek
government debt, but investors don't know this because the
investments held by Spanish banks are not transparent, then
investors may start withdrawing funds from Spanish banks. 2 92 To
stick with this Article's example, mere uncertainty about Spanish
banks' exposure to Greece's financial crisis may be enough to
undercut the solvency of Spanish banks.
However, it is important to realize that neither the actual extent
of cross-border financial ties nor uncertainty about the extent of these
ties is likely to depend substantially on membership in the Eurozone.
Expelling a country from the Eurozone does not per se change the
extent to which firms from other member states are invested in that
country's sovereign bonds or private corporations. The ability to
invest in another member state is based on provisions on the free
movement of capital, which apply independently of Eurozone
membership. 293 Tellingly, at the moment of the Greek referendum,
when the threat of expulsion was arguably greatest, UK banks held

See Platon Monokroussos et al., Grexit and Why It Will Not Happen:
289.
Catastrophicfor Greece and Destabilizingfor the Euro 36 (June 10, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Soc. Sci. Research Network), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2616278 [https:/perma.cc/MR78-75XG] (archived Mar. 6, 2016) (stressing the crucial
role of the financial sector with respect to the problem of financial contagion).
This type of financial contagion, especially if the debt is issued by a private
290.
party, is also referred to as counterparty contagion. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 286, at
455 (defining "counterparty contagion" as "the domino effect [which] occurs when the
failure of one firm leads directly to the failure of other firms that are its counterparties
because the counterparties relied on payment or future business from the initial failed
firm").
291.
For that reason, much thinking has gone into the question of whether one
can reduce such uncertainty by reducing complexity. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 658 (2012) (noting the increasing complexity of capital
markets and thinking about possible solutions).
292.
This phenomenon, too, is sometimes referred to as information contagion.
E.g., Mark J. Roe, ClearinghouseOverconfidence, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1653 (2013).
See TFEU, supra note 41, art. 56 (guaranteeing the free movement of
293.
capital between member states as well as between member states and third countries).
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more Greek debt than banks from any other member state except
Germany, 2 94 even though the United Kingdom has never been part of
the Eurozone. It follows that even if a country were expelled from the
Eurozone, this would probably not reduce the risk of financial
29 5
contagion to a meaningful extent.
(c). Deterrence
Could one at least argue that the deterrent effect of - possible
expulsion from the Eurozone would be strong enough to prevent
member states from getting into trouble in the first place? 296 Again,
the answer is probably not. That is because even if economically
troubled member states could be expelled from the Eurozone, the ex
ante likelihood of a member state being expelled because of a Greecetype crisis-let alone before an economic crisis sets in-is exceedingly
low. Other member states would inevitably fear that they could be
next and would therefore be reluctant to vote in favor of expulsion.
Tellingly, the suspension clause of Article 7 of the TEU has never
been invoked against any member state. 29 7 Moreover, despite the fact
that various member states have repeatedly violated the strictures of
the Stability and Growth Pact, no country has ever been fined for
doing so. 298 But if the European Union cannot even muster the will to
enforce potentially modest sanctions under the Stability and Growth
Pact, it is far-fetched to believe that the mere violation of that pact,
with or without an economic crisis, would lead countries to make use

294.
See The Greek Debt Crisis Story in Numbers, BBC (July 10, 2015), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33407742
[https://perma.cc/98JV-CEZH] (archived
Mar. 6, 2016).
295.
At most, one could try to invoke an indirect effect: if markets believe that
Eurozone countries are less likely to be allowed to become insolvent, then Greece's
membership in the Eurozone will make financial institutions in other countries more
likely to buy Greek government debt. Thus, allowing Greece to stay in the Eurozone
seems to increase the potential for financial contagion. However, this line of reasoning
is questionable for two reasons. First, as previously noted, markets no longer appear to
harbor the assumption that a country's Eurozone membership offers substantial
protection against that country becoming insolvent. And second, even if markets still
held such an assumption, the introduction of an expansive expulsion remedy would
quickly put an end to it. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that allowing the
Eurozone to expel financially troubled member states would reduce the risk of crossborder financial contagion.
296.
Alexander Sturm, Wirtschaftsexperte Walk: "Ein Notfallpaket fir die
Mdrkte Lduft Schon" [Economic Expert Walk: 'A Rescue Package for the Markets Is
Already Underway'l, EURO AM SONNTAG (July 7, 2015), http://www.finanzen.net/
nachricht/aktien/Interview-exklusiv-Wirtschaftsexperte Walk 34-EinNotfalpaket fuerdie-Maerkte-laeuft-schon-34-4415655 [https://perma.c/QY9S-8XBU] (archived Mar. 6,
2016) (citing expectations that a Greek exit from the Eurozone would deter other
member states from disregarding the Eurozone's rules).
297.
Austria was once subjected to sanctions, but these were not based on
Article 7 of the TEU. Schorkopf, supra note 207, 62.
298.
Boskin, supra note 215.
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of the much more drastic sanction of expelling a member state from
the Eurozone.
In sum, it is simply not clear what legitimate interests an
expulsion right against economically troubled countries might serve.
Such an expulsion remedy is not necessary to prevent future bailouts,
it does not promise to reduce the risk of cross-border financial
contagion, and it is bound to be ineffective as a deterrent.
b. The Extreme Case
Whereas the right to expel member states in a Greece-type
scenario would offer few benefits, one can easily conceive of more
extreme scenarios where such a right would yield obvious
advantages.
The European Union's Achilles heel is its dependence on member
states' voluntary compliance. Admittedly, when member states
violate EU law, they are subject to no shortage of sanctions. To begin
with, if the violation rises to the level of a persistent and grave breach
of the fundamental values listed in Article 2 of the TEU, the member
29 9
state risks a suspension of its rights under Article 7 of the TEU.
Furthermore, any member state breaching EU law may face an
infringement proceeding under Articles 258, 259 of the TFEU, 300 and,
if the breaching member state does not comply with the resulting
judgment, it may face a lump sum or penalty payment. 30 1 Moreover,
states violating the Stability and Growth Pact face fines of up to 0.5
percent of their GDP. 302
However, if a state is determined not to pay any fines or
penalties and to ignore any judgments, then the European Union has
limited options. Unlike the federal government in the United States,
the European Commission does not have the option of sending federal
troops to enforce federal law against renitent states as, for example,
President Eisenhower did to ensure the enforcement of a federal
desegregation court order at Little Rock. 30 3 At most, the European
Commission may commence a proceeding under Article 7 to suspend
30 4
the state's rights, such as its voting rights in the Council.
However, a renitent government may not find this prospect overly
threatening.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that a member state's
open revolt against the European Union's legal system may come to

299.
300.
301.
302.
imposition
303.
304.

TEU, supra note 142, art. 7(3).
TFEU, supra note 41, arts. 258, 259.
Id. art. 260(3).
Council Regulation 1467/97, supra note 49, art. 12 (authorizing the
of fines of up to 0.5 percent of GDP).
See supra note 269.
TEU, supra note 142, art. 7.
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present a vital threat to that legal system. Such a revolt risks setting
in motion a chain reaction that ultimately destroys the European
Union's legal order. To be clear, member states already have the right
to leave the European Union. However, the concern is not that states
might leave the European Union. Rather, the concern is that member
states might remain within the European Union but refuse to obey by
its rules, thereby prompting the gradual collapse of the European
Union's legal system.
It should then be clear why the expulsion remedy ought not to be
taken off the table entirely. If a member state were to dare an open
revolt against the legal system of the monetary union, and if that
revolt were to represent a threat to the survival or functioning of the
Eurozone or even the European Union, then an expulsion remedy
would be of obvious use. To call such a scenario unrealistic would be
naive. Admittedly, no such scenario has arisen so far, but the
European Union-which was started in 1957 as the European
Economic Community 3 5-has existed for less than sixty years, and
the Eurozone is barely more than fifteen years old. Europe's history is
filled with breakups of supranational empires, and only the most
radical Panglossian could deny that the Eurozone and even the
European Union may eventually face that threat. Tellingly, in the
context of the Greek crisis, Claude Juncker, President of the
European Commission, has expressed precisely the fear that the
Eurozone may break up. 306 The difficult question, then, is not
whether the expulsion remedy should be available as an ultima ratio.
It should. Rather, the challenge is to define the preconditions of the
expulsion remedy in such a way as to prevent its abuse.
c. When Should the Expulsion Remedy be Available?
Based on the above, one can state that the expulsion remedy
should be available when a member state's conduct presents a threat
to the existence and functioning of the Eurozone or even the
European Union. Furthermore, the expulsion remedy has to remain a
means of last resort.
Admittedly, both requirements are somewhat vague. However,
given that it is impossible to predict the challenges that may face the
European Union in the future, it is not possible or even desirable to
define a precise rule that determines in which cases the expulsion
remedy is available. Instead, it is preferable to rely on a standard

305.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11.
306.
Georgi Gotev, Juncker: If Greece Leaves, Anglo-Saxons Wl Try to Break up
Eurozone, EURACITV (May 5, 2015), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/
juncker-if-greece-leaves-anglo-saxons-will-try-break-eurozone- 314308 [https//permaWc7K
KQ-K3KU] (archived Mar. 6,2016).

20161

PARADISE LOST

that leaves the Court of Justice with sufficient leeway to react to
30 7
unforeseen developments.
Moreover, while one cannot exhaustively define which types of
misconduct are sufficiently grave to prompt the expulsion remedy, the
history of the European Union at least makes it possible to provide
some guidelines on what cannot suffice to justify a member state's
expulsion from the Eurozone.
i. Conscious and Repeated Violations of EU Law
As a general rule, the mere failure to obey by EU law, even if it
occurs knowingly and repeatedly, cannot per se justify such an
expulsion. The obvious reason is that such failures are fairly common.
For example, member states have repeatedly and consciously violated

the Stability and Growth Pact without being held accountable.

30 8

This has been true even for large member states such as France and
30 9
Even moving beyond the realm of monetary and
Germany.
economic policy, conscious violations of EU law are frequent. Member
states routinely fail to transpose EU directives into national law in a
timely fashion.

3 10

They also often take their time to react to decisions

by the Court of Justice, 3 1 1 which is precisely why the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union now provides for lump sum and
penalty payments in case of noncompliance with the Court's
3 12
None of these violations of EU law has ever presented
judgments.
a serious threat to the survival or functioning of the Eurozone or the

European Union.
ii. Open Defiance

Nor does open defiance by itself suffice to justify the expulsion
remedy. Episodes in which member states demonstratively refused to
comply with EU law can readily be found in the European Union's

Regarding the distinction between rules, whose content is defined ex ante,
307.
and standards, whose content is defined ex post, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 557 (1992).
308.
See Boskin, supra note 215 (noting that, even before the recession, the
Stability and Growth Pact was routinely violated).
See Blitzer, supra note 216 (noting that Germany repeatedly violated the
309.
Stability and Growth Pact between 2001 and 2007); Feldstein, supra note 216 (noting
that both France and Germany violated the Stability and Growth Pact).
See Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU Law (2014), COM
310.
(2015) 329 final, at 17 (July 9, 2015) (noting that 'late transposition of directives by
Member States remains a persistent problem.").
See id. at 16 (noting sixty-one cases in which infringement proceedings
311.
remained open because member states had not yet complied with Court of Justice's
judgments).
See TFEU, supra note 41, art. 260(3) (allowing for the imposition of
312.
penalties if member states fail to comply with judgments of the European Court of
Justice).
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history; they have come and gone without putting an end to the
European project.
Perhaps the most brazen case of open defiance to date was the
so-called "empty chair crisis" from 1965 to 1966. Irked by the other
member states' interest in the development of a supranational
dimension of the then so-called European Economic Community,
France boycotted the meetings of the Council of Ministers, thereby
forcing the Council's work to come to a stop, until the so-called
Luxembourg compromise resolved the conflict largely in France's
3 13
favor.
An equally famous and arguably more dangerous case of open
insubordination, this time from a member state's judiciary, is the
German Constitutional Court's Solange I decision from 1974.314 The
case concerned the relationship between European Community law
and member state law. 3 15 At the time, the Court of Justice had
already held that the law of the European Economic Community, as
the European Union was then called, enjoyed primacy over the law of
the member states. 3 16 This meant that member state law could not be
31 7
applied to the extent that it conflicted with European law.
However, in Solange I, the German Constitutional Court took a
different view. It enumerated various shortcomings of the European
legal system such as the lack of a directly elected parliament and the
absence of a codified catalogue of fundamental rights comparable to
that offered by the German Constitution. 3 18 In the eyes of the
German Constitutional Court, these deficiencies meant that
European law was insufficient to guarantee an adequate level of
protection for fundamental rights. 31 9 Therefore, the German
Constitutional Court held that European law was subject to the
jurisdiction of the German Constitutional Court and was
"inapplicable because and to the extent that it violates one of the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution."3 20 Only
about ten years later, in the equally famous Solange II decision, did
the German Constitutional Court come to the conclusion the

313.
For a brief summary of relevant events, see, e.g., Desmond Dinan, Fifty
Years of European Integration: A Remarkable Achievement, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
1118, 1129 (2008); Rafael Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Policy up to Par?:A Legal Analysis
over Time-Rome, Marrakesh, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional Treaty, 13
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 367 (2007).
314.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
29, 1974, 2 C.M.L.R. 540 (Ger.) [Solange 1].
315.
Id.
316.
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle ftir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 3.
317.
Costa v. Ente Nazionale Energie Elettrica [ENEL], 1964 E.C.R., at 585.
318.
See Solange I, supra note 313, at 62.
319.
Id.
320.
Id. (translation by author).

20161

PARADISE LOST

protection of fundamental rights under European law was now
sufficiently strong and therefore decided, for the time being, to no
longer exercise jurisdiction over EU law. 32 1 Yet even the Solange II
decision does not amount to a complete recognition of the primacy of
EU law, 322 since the German Constitutional Court explicitly reserved
the right to reassert its own jurisdiction should EU law ever cease to
meet the standards set forth in Solange .323
Neither the policy of the empty chair nor Solange I ended up
dooming European integration. Quite the contrary, some scholars
now praise the German Constitutional Court's Solange I decision for
pressuring the European Court of Justice into taking fundamental
rights more seriously. 324 This suggests that open defiance should not
per se suffice to make the expulsion remedy available.
d. Procedural Safeguards
It is also useful to think about which procedural safeguards
should apply to the expulsion remedy. To ensure that the substantive
requirements for such an expulsion are actually satisfied, the decision
to expel a member state from the Eurozone should be fully subject to
judicial review by the Court of Justice. In other words, it should
ultimately be the Court of Justice's responsibility to determine
whether a state's conduct truly represents a threat to the functioning
or existence of the Eurozone or the European Union and whether this
threat cannot be averted by less drastic means. In analogy to Article
7 of the TEU, the Court ought to take into account the interests of the
member state's citizens in making that determination.
The question remains how many of the other member states
should have to call for an expulsion from the Eurozone. One obvious
solution is to once more draw an analogy to Article 7 of the TEU and
demand that at least a four-fifths majority of the other member states
have approved the expulsion. Beyond that, it does not necessarily

Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct.
321.
22, 1986, 3 C.M.L.R. 225 (Ger.) [Solange 11].
322.
See Marko Milanovic, Norm Conflict in InternationalLaw: Whither Human
Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69, 111 (2009); Michelle Iodice, Note, Solange in
Athens, 32 B.U. INT'L L.J. 539, 543 (2014) (noting that Solange II did not amount to a
surrender of the German Constitutional Court's jurisdiction over fundamental rights).
See lodice, supra note 322, at 543; Davor Jani6, Caveats from Karlsruhe
323.
and Berlin: Whither Democracy After Lisbon?, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 337, 343 (2010);
Milanovic, supra note 322, at 111.
See, e.g., Cathryn Costello, The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of
324.
Human Rights: FundamentalRights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe, 6 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 87 (2006); Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The International
Obligation of State Organs, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 138-39 (2003). But see Manfred
Zuleeg, A Community of Law: Legal Cohesion in the European Union, 20 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 623, 627 (1997) (calling it "a myth that Solange I encouraged the ECJ to
incorporate fundamental rights into Community law.").
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seem wise to insist on the remaining safeguards listed in Article 7 of
the TEU. The various steps that Article 7 provides for are so
cumbersome as to make the procedure unwieldy. Given that the
expulsion remedy is only admissible in those situations in which
there exists an actual threat to the existence of functioning of the
Eurozone or European Union, imposing a slow and cumbersome
procedure seems problematic. As the sovereign debt crisis has shown,
threats to the functioning of the financial system may require swift
action, and the same is likely to be true for the expulsion remedy.
e. What about Greece?
How do these principles apply to the Greek crisis? Based on the
foregoing, one can only conclude that Greece is far from satisfying the
necessary elements for an expulsion from the Eurozone. The failure to
comply with the economic strictures of the Eurozone during an
economic downturn is not per se enough to represent a threat to the
functioning of the Eurozone. Indeed, Greece's sins seem rather minor
when compared to the threats posed by France's conduct during the
empty chair crisis or the German Constitutional Court's refusal to
accept the primacy of EU law in its Solange I decision.
Accordingly, those who believe that Greece's expulsion from the
Eurozone would violate EU law are completely right. The important
point, though, is that they are right because Greece's conduct does not
satisfy the preconditions of the expulsion remedy. By contrast, one
should not make the mistake of denying the existence of an expulsion
remedy entirely.

V. CONCLUSION

Can the European Union expel a member state from the
Eurozone? Legal scholars generally agree that the answer is "no."
They typically justify that answer by pointing to the fact that the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union does not mention
any such expulsion right.
However, this Article has shown that this and other doctrinal
arguments are ultimately unpersuasive. Many of the most important
doctrines in European law have no explicit basis in the text of the
Treaties. What ultimately matters, therefore, is whether there are
important policy reasons for recognizing an expulsion remedy, and
that question has to be answered in the affirmative. In principle,
therefore, a right to expel member states from the Eurozone must be
recognized both de lege ferenda and de lege lata.
Crucially, though, such an expulsion remedy must be handled
very restrictively. Properly understood, the expulsion of a member
state from the Eurozone requires a threat to the existence or
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functioning of the Eurozone or the European Union. Furthermore, the
expulsion of a member state has to remain the ultima ratio. Where
these preconditions are met, there is no reason to take the expulsion
remedy off the table. Quite on the contrary, the ability to expel
member states from the Eurozone may yet prove crucial to the future
of the Eurozone and perhaps even the European Union.

